Re: [openpgp] Keyholder-configurable fingerprint schemes?

"brian m. carlson" <sandals@crustytoothpaste.net> Tue, 10 November 2015 02:19 UTC

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Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2015 02:19:43 +0000
From: "brian m. carlson" <sandals@crustytoothpaste.net>
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Subject: Re: [openpgp] Keyholder-configurable fingerprint schemes?
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On Sat, Nov 07, 2015 at 12:31:43PM +0900, Bryan Ford wrote:
> This approach to fingerprint generation has the slightly-odd
> (certainly unconventional) property that a single public/private
> keypair does not have only one possible, deterministically-computed
> fingerprint (i.e., a hash of the public key), but rather may in
> principle have many different possible fingerprints (parameterized by
> the PoW and the salt that will inevitably be required in that PoW).
> This might seem to violate the “fingerprint consistency” property that
> was discussed at the meeting.  However, as summarized above, my
> perception is that the main fingerprint consistency concern is that we
> do not want to subject users to multiple different fingerprints *for a
> single key*.  In Christian’s scheme, while any key could “in
> principle” have many different fingerprints, as long as the user
> generating the key (or the user’s OpenPGP implementation) picks one
> particular fingerprint and binds that fingerprint to the key in a
> fully verifiable fashion as part of the self-signed public-key record,
> the fact that fingerprint-generation is parameterized creates no
> user-perceivable fingerprint-consistency issue that I can discern.

I think not having a single unique fingerprint is in general a bad idea.
Earlier discussion on the list reflected wanting to remove creation
timestamps so we had a fingerprint that was consistent and represented
the actual key bits uniquely.  Using a parameterized proof-of-work
scheme defeats that goal.

Furthermore, one of the benefits of elliptic curve algorithms is the
tiny keys.  You could theoretically send an entire EC public key in a QR
code and still get the same fingerprint on both sides.  Including a
proof-of-work makes that impossible.

Finally, there's been a lot of discussion about simplifying the
standard.  This doesn't seem like a move in that direction.
-- 
brian m. carlson / brian with sandals: Houston, Texas, US
+1 832 623 2791 | https://www.crustytoothpaste.net/~bmc | My opinion only
OpenPGP: RSA v4 4096b: 88AC E9B2 9196 305B A994 7552 F1BA 225C 0223 B187