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Subject: [openpgp] Re: implicit PSK key capabilities
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From: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
To: Andrew Gallagher <andrewg@andrewg.com>
Cc: openpgp@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [openpgp] implicit PSK key capabilities
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Date: Fri, 25 Sep 2026 17:06:20 -0400
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On Fri 2026-09-25 20:43:18 +0100, Andrew Gallagher wrote:
> On 25 Sep 2026, at 20:11, Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net> wro=
te:
>>=20
>> I'm not sure i have a strong preference, but the latter approach
>> (implicit capabilities) seemed easiest to write up.  I've taken a
>> crack at writing it down here
>
> I like the general direction here, but I think it would be simpler
> (and more future proof) to invert the enumeration - in other words,
> say that by default all capabilities are allowed, and just list any
> exceptions or caveats.

i guess i'm not sure what that would mean, really.  no one is proposing
any particular limit, but we also know that there is a general
cryptographic consensus that using the same secret key in two distinct
mechanisms runs the risk of being a footgun.

I tried to avoid using exclusive language in the MR, and instead to list
three use cases that have effective domain separation from each other as
examples to give the reader a sense of how the mechanism could be used
reliably.

Actively encouraging people to use the same PSK anywhere seems risky
given all the sharp edges that guidance is likely to expose.

Anyway, i'm not wedded to the text i proposed, i just wanted to get the
process moving.  if anyone else wants to propose an alternative, i'd be
happy to help review.

        --dkg

--=-=-=--
