Re: secure sign & encrypt

Derek Atkins <warlord@mit.edu> Thu, 23 May 2002 19:51 UTC

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To: Terje Braaten <Terje.Braaten@concept.fr>
Cc: OpenPGP <ietf-openpgp@imc.org>
Subject: Re: secure sign & encrypt
References: <1F4F2D8ADFFCD411819300B0D0AA862E29ABF3@csexch.Conceptfr.net>
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@mit.edu>
Date: Thu, 23 May 2002 15:42:50 -0400
In-Reply-To: <1F4F2D8ADFFCD411819300B0D0AA862E29ABF3@csexch.Conceptfr.net>
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I'm not sure exactly what you mean by when you say Alice saves a copy
of the session key... How does Alice get that key to Charlie?  Also
keep in mind that the interior and exterior encryptions SHOULD be
using different session keys.  So, I don't understand what you mean?

Can you show the packets that Charlie sees?  I don't see any way
to add a new ESK on the interior message without invalidating the
signature....

-derek

Terje Braaten <Terje.Braaten@concept.fr> writes:

> David P. Kemp <dpkemp@missi.ncsc.mil> wrote:
> > Your proposal for an extra packet does not address this alleged flaw.
> > Note that Alice could sign a message saying "encrypted to 
> > Bob", and then
> > encrypt and send the message to Charlie, thus framing Bob for breach
> > of confidence.
> 
> Now that I have had time to think about it, the same could be done if
> we used ESE. Alice can encrypt the packet to Bob and save a copy of
> the symmetric key used to encrypt the message before encrypting it with
> Bobs public key. Then she sign the encrypted packet, include some extra
> packet with the session key she saved and encrypt it for Charlie.
> Then Charlie receives an ESE packet where he can decrypt the inner
> encryption
> with the symmtreic key provided. And looking at the signature it looks like
> it is originally encrypted for Bob, so it "must" be Bob that has leaked
> the information and also given him the symmetric key.
> 
> So, in that respect my solution is no inferior to ESE regarding security.
> And you avoid the cost of one extra encryption.
> 
> -- 
> Terje BrĂ¥ten
> 

-- 
       Derek Atkins, SB '93 MIT EE, SM '95 MIT Media Laboratory
       Member, MIT Student Information Processing Board  (SIPB)
       URL: http://web.mit.edu/warlord/    PP-ASEL-IA     N1NWH
       warlord@MIT.EDU                        PGP key available