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[openpgp] Re: I-D Action: draft-ietf-openpgp-replacementkey-02.txt

Daniel Huigens <d.huigens@protonmail.com> Mon, 27 January 2025 17:47 UTC

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Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2025 17:46:56 +0000
To: Andrew Gallagher <andrewg@andrewg.com>
From: Daniel Huigens <d.huigens@protonmail.com>
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Subject: [openpgp] Re: I-D Action: draft-ietf-openpgp-replacementkey-02.txt
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On Monday, January 27th, 2025 at 18:09, Andrew Gallagher <andrewg@andrewg.com> wrote:

> It would only work if B was already the (bound equivalent) replacement of A, and then the key holder subsequently lost access to A. It could be years later they misplaced the passphrase or some such. They could still say “upgrade from A to B if you can”, but without encouraging fallback.

In this scenario, perhaps key A could designate key B as a [delegated revoker](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-dkg-openpgp-revocation-01.html#delegated-revoker) as well, such that key B can revoke key A once it's time for that? (And once that idea or some variant of it is implemented, of course..)

Best,
Daniel

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