IETF Logo Mail Archive

[openpgp] Summary v5 fingerprint proposal

Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> Thu, 23 March 2017 07:58 UTC

Return-Path: <wk@gnupg.org>
X-Original-To: openpgp@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: openpgp@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 58B021317D0 for <openpgp@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 23 Mar 2017 00:58:13 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.9
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.9 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-5] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id LtS-0wMeKCM1 for <openpgp@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 23 Mar 2017 00:58:10 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from kerckhoffs.g10code.com (kerckhoffs.g10code.com [IPv6:2001:aa8:fff1:100::22]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9C7F31317C0 for <openpgp@ietf.org>; Thu, 23 Mar 2017 00:58:10 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from uucp by kerckhoffs.g10code.com with local-rmail (Exim 4.84_2 #1 (Debian)) id 1cqxdI-00041j-7H for <openpgp@ietf.org>; Thu, 23 Mar 2017 08:58:08 +0100
Received: from wk by wheatstone.g10code.de with local (Exim 4.84 #3 (Debian)) id 1cqxYR-0007Xh-UK for <openpgp@ietf.org>; Thu, 23 Mar 2017 08:53:07 +0100
From: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
To: openpgp@ietf.org
Organisation: The GnuPG Project
X-message-flag: Mails containing HTML will not be read! Please send only plain text.
OpenPGP: url=https://k.gnupg.net/80615870F5BAD690333686D0F2AD85AC1E42B367
Mail-Followup-To: openpgp@ietf.org
Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2017 08:53:07 +0100
Message-ID: <8737e4o2e4.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de>
User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="=threat_government_csim_Fedayeen_strategic_MIT-LL_Clinton_passwd_SWAT"; micalg="pgp-sha256"; protocol="application/pgp-signature"
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/openpgp/VnA0s6EnabtJBrp4-kSdmvIWtik>
Subject: [openpgp] Summary v5 fingerprint proposal
X-BeenThere: openpgp@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.22
Precedence: list
List-Id: "Ongoing discussion of OpenPGP issues." <openpgp.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/openpgp>, <mailto:openpgp-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/openpgp/>
List-Post: <mailto:openpgp@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:openpgp-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/openpgp>, <mailto:openpgp-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2017 07:58:13 -0000

Hi!

I try to summarize the positions on the v5 fingerprint porposal:

In favor of SHA-512 truncated to 200 bits:

  - Thijs: Not a strong preference, though.

  - Jon: Speed of fingerprint computing doesn't matter.  SHA-512 is more
         future proof.

In favor of SHA-256 truncated to 200 bits:

  - Vincent: Even wants to truncate to 160 bits.

  - Derek: Better for small systems.  He gave numbers and showed that
           for fingerprints SHA-256 is even faster on systems where
           SHA-512 is in general faster.

  - Peter Gutmann: Better for small systems.

  - Werner: Allows SHA-256 only implementation to support IoST systems.


Other comments:

  - Jon: Use SHA-512/t to have a well defined truncation scheme.

  - Peter Todd: Do not truncated because the saving is not worth using a
                non-standard scheme.

  - Brian: Use SHAKE128 or 256, will be needed anyway if we add
           Curve448.

  - Werner: Using SHA-512 would allow compliant applications in case
            Ed25519 would be a mandatory algorithm.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.

v2.23.0 | Report a Bug | By Email