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Re: [openpgp] Intent to deprecate: Insecure primitives

Stephen Paul Weber <singpolyma@singpolyma.net> Mon, 16 March 2015 21:15 UTC

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Date: Mon, 16 Mar 2015 16:15:18 -0500
From: Stephen Paul Weber <singpolyma@singpolyma.net>
To: David Leon Gil <coruus@gmail.com>
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Cc: "openpgp@ietf.org" <openpgp@ietf.org>, Jon Callas <jon@callas.org>
Subject: Re: [openpgp] Intent to deprecate: Insecure primitives
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>My impression was that many new implementations use the RSA-S and RSA-E

The opposite is true.  RSA-S and RSA-E are from old implementations.  These 
days there are more robust ways to specify what a key is for.

>I generally prefer domain separation, but I don't think there's a relevant
>security difference *so long as* implementations do not generate a single
>RSA key such that its key usage intersects only one of {certify, sign,
>authenticate} or {encrypt communications, encrypt bulk}.

For sure, but this seperation is done in metadata, not in the algorithm 
identifier.

-- 
Stephen Paul Weber, @singpolyma
See <http://singpolyma.net> for how I prefer to be contacted
edition right joseph

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