Re: [openpgp] Expiration impending: <draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc4880bis-01.txt>

["Robert J. Hansen" <[e-mail]>]

> May I kindly ask if part of the critcal an necessary changes is
> sunsetting 3DES, SHA1.

The latest draft minimizes (but does not eliminate) SHA-1.  3DES is
still a MUST-implement algorithm, and will likely be so for the ongoing
future.  3DES has been a MUST algorithm since RFC2440, way back when;
there's a lot of data encrypted with it and the RFC will continue to
require 3DES be supported in order to help interoperate with old traffic.

> I expierence in private an buisness live extra efforts to ensure pgp
> communication is not using 3DES for example which
> costs percious time in our projects.

Why?  What problem is presented by using 3DES for your work, which is so
severe that you have to ensure 3DES isn't used?

Seriously: it's still believed to be a strong cipher, there are no
practical attacks on it, and no new attacks are looming on the horizon.
3DES is slow and it only has a 64-bit block size, but for the vast
majority of OpenPGP usage that's not a problem.