Re: [openpgp] Deprecate legacy hash algorithms
Hanno Böck <hanno@hboeck.de> Fri, 17 March 2017 15:05 UTC
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Date: Fri, 17 Mar 2017 16:05:30 +0100
From: Hanno Böck <hanno@hboeck.de>
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Subject: Re: [openpgp] Deprecate legacy hash algorithms
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On Fri, 17 Mar 2017 10:00:10 +0100 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> wrote: > Implementations MUST implement SHA-256. Implementations MAY > implement other algorithms. Implementations MUST NOT create messages > which require the use of SHA-1 with the exception of computing > version 4 key fingerprints and for purposes of the MDC packet. > Implementations MUST NOT use MD5 or RIPE-MD/160. I'm wondering: Should there be a clearer distinction that this is for creation of messages? Because for verification I feel supporting bad algorithms is still okay. Like if I want to verify a signature done with md5 it makes sense that I'm able to do that. Ideally that would include a warning ("This message was sigend with a weak hash alg"), but not supporting it doesn't seem right. -- Hanno Böck https://hboeck.de/ mail/jabber: hanno@hboeck.de GPG: FE73757FA60E4E21B937579FA5880072BBB51E42
- [openpgp] Deprecate legacy hash algorithms Werner Koch
- Re: [openpgp] Deprecate legacy hash algorithms Hanno Böck
- Re: [openpgp] Deprecate legacy hash algorithms Jon Callas
- Re: [openpgp] Deprecate legacy hash algorithms Werner Koch
- Re: [openpgp] Deprecate legacy hash algorithms Werner Koch