Re: [openpgp] Replacing the OpenPGP Encryption Mode is Harmful and Pointless

Daniel Huigens <d.huigens@protonmail.com> Tue, 19 July 2022 09:01 UTC

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Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2022 09:00:54 +0000
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To: Bruce Walzer <bwalzer@59.ca>
From: Daniel Huigens <d.huigens@protonmail.com>
Cc: openpgp@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [openpgp] Replacing the OpenPGP Encryption Mode is Harmful and Pointless
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On Monday, July 18th, 2022 at 23:45, Bruce Walzer wrote:

> I am not sure why it would be required to go over the data twice for
> OCFB-MDC. Since it is streamable, I don't know how that would even be
> possible.

Of course both can be done simultaneously, but OCFB-MDC has to compute
two functions on the data: the block cipher and SHA1. OCB, by contrast,
is an integrated scheme; it only calls the block cipher. It is thus
almost as efficient as only encrypting the data, but also provides
integrity, almost for free. See [1] for more information.

Best,
Daniel

[1]: https://web.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/ocb/ocb-faq.htm