Re: [openpgp] OpenPGPv5 wish list

ianG <iang@iang.org> Mon, 29 April 2013 09:40 UTC

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Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2013 12:40:14 +0300
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Subject: Re: [openpgp] OpenPGPv5 wish list
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On 29/04/13 12:15 PM, Jean-Jacques wrote:

> 2) What is the key used for?
>
> And I see at least 4 purposes :
>   - To authenticate itself through TLS  [RFC6091]
>   - Maybe To sign other certificates (subkeys on smartcard issues)
>   - To authenticate through HTTP (gpgauth or
>     https://github.com/Open-UDC/open-udc/blob/master/docs/HTTP_OpenPGP_Authentication.draft.txt)
>   - To sign an OpenUDC transaction.
>
> I work especially on the 2 last purposes. And having the possibility
> for the owner to set descriptions, or more flags on its (sub)keys inside
> its OpenPGP certificate, would be a more elegant solution than some
> workaround we have to manage.


Some comments from my experience/perspective, only.  In my work I have 
done this by using pgp's comment field aka uid.  Here's some:

$ gpg -k | grep uid

uid                  Iang [certification] (Africa-2012) <iang@iang.org>;
uid                  Iang [contract] (lowsec-PIZZA-only) <iang@iang.org>;
uid                  Systemics [operator] (Africa-2012) <iang@iang.org>;
uid                  Systemics [server] (Babba-2012) <iang@iang.org>;
uid                  Systemics [receipt] (Babba-2012) <iang@iang.org>;
uid                  Systemics [receipt] (offa-20130101) <iang@iang.org>;
uid                  Systemics [server] (offa-20130102) <iang@iang.org>;


In my software I use the [tag] for the purpose, the (text) as a human 
comment, and everything else as the name of the keyholder.  You could do 
whatever tho.

Perhaps more on point, I do not want the OpenPGP system to provide me 
with bits that allow me to set purpose or anything else, because OpenPGP 
is too low-level.  My designed claims like "this is an operator key" are 
too involved in the business layer to be foisted onto anyone else.  The 
history of key-bits being used for human claims suggests this is a fast 
way to failure.  E.g., non-revocation and the infamous 
you-must-understand-me bit.

I don't know if this logic applies to anyone else.  But if it did, 
hypothetically, I might record your claims in my key uids as such:



uid                  Iang [HTTP-auth] (social-networks) <iang@iang.org>;
uid                  Systemics [UDC-agent] (Black-2012) <iang@iang.org>;





iang