RE: draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt

["Richie Laager" <[e-mail]>]

 
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: Bodo Moeller [mailto:[e-mail]] 
> Sent: Monday, September 23, 2002 1:03 PM
> To: Richie Laager
> Cc: 'Derek Atkins'; 'Jon Callas'; 'OpenPGP'
> Subject: Re: draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt
> 
> 
> On Mon, Sep 23, 2002 at 12:48:16PM -0500, Richie Laager wrote:
> 
> >> Yes he can -- this is exactly the problem [1] that I want to
> >> solve with my suggested change to the specification.  The way
> >> Jon wants to use key expiration, the bad guy can keep the key
> >> alive
> >> indefinitely. I call this a protocol failure, he calls it a
> >> feature.
> 
> > I've been following this thread somewhat, and I have the
> > following suggestion: [...]
> 
> Did you read my original message from the mailing list archives?
> There is a simple workaround for the protocol failure, which does
> not have the problems of your proposal: whenever someone certifies
> someone else's key, then if this key has an expiration time set,
> the certification signature should get an expiration time too such
> that the signature's validity period extends no longer into the
> future than the key's validity period.

How does this help? If a "bad guy" gets the private key, he can
simply resign everyone's key.

Richie

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