Re: [openpgp] Intent to deprecate: Insecure primitives
Andrew Skretvedt <andrew.skretvedt@gmail.com> Sun, 22 March 2015 09:18 UTC
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Date: Sun, 22 Mar 2015 09:18:21 +0000
From: Andrew Skretvedt <andrew.skretvedt@gmail.com>
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References: <r422Ps-1075i-0DAFD7F0DE904C66B37F279A05E0CB4A@Williams-MacBook-Pro.local> <sjm8uerhchh.fsf@securerf.ihtfp.org>
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Subject: Re: [openpgp] Intent to deprecate: Insecure primitives
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I am a curious onlooker with no operational affiliation to the business of this list (and normally silent), with an observation/question at this point in this thread: Is it considered best practice now to encrypt, then sign? I think I heard somewhere that SSL/TLS does it the other-way-round and has thereby innocently created certain problems. GnuPG allows these operations to be combined on the command line, and then I don't know in what order they actually occur. If you receive an encrypted and signed message, and best practice would be to, in reasonable time, decrypt from wire-format and re-encrypt to local format for PFS (which seems to me a really sound policy, given modern experiences, and might be just as easy as leaving it to your full-disk-encryption system where you store your mail), might you lose the ability to provably authenticate the messages in your archive? I can think of situations where one would not want to lose this ability (e.g. some sort of dispute or legal proceeding). Perhaps if they get signed, then encrypted, this problem goes away. But then why /should/ one do these two operations in one order in the e-mail context, but perhaps the opposite order in others? (Perhaps I betray my ignorance at this point.)
- Re: [openpgp] Intent to deprecate: Insecure primi… Falcon Darkstar Momot
- Re: [openpgp] Intent to deprecate: Insecure primi… Wyllys Ingersoll
- Re: [openpgp] Intent to deprecate: Insecure primi… Werner Koch
- Re: [openpgp] Intent to deprecate: Insecure primi… David Leon Gil
- Re: [openpgp] Intent to deprecate: Insecure primi… Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [openpgp] Intent to deprecate: Insecure primi… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [openpgp] Intent to deprecate: Insecure primi… Kristian Fiskerstrand
- Re: [openpgp] Intent to deprecate: Insecure primi… Derek Atkins
- Re: [openpgp] Intent to deprecate: Insecure primi… Stephen Paul Weber
- Re: [openpgp] Intent to deprecate: Insecure primi… David Shaw
- Re: [openpgp] Intent to deprecate: Insecure primi… Bill Frantz
- Re: [openpgp] Intent to deprecate: Insecure primi… vedaal
- Re: [openpgp] Intent to deprecate: Insecure primi… Jon Callas
- Re: [openpgp] Intent to deprecate: Insecure primi… David Leon Gil
- Re: [openpgp] Intent to deprecate: Insecure primi… David Leon Gil
- Re: [openpgp] Intent to deprecate: Insecure primi… David Leon Gil
- Re: [openpgp] Intent to deprecate: Insecure primi… Stephen Paul Weber
- Re: [openpgp] Intent to deprecate: Insecure primi… David Shaw
- [openpgp] Intent to deprecate: Insecure primitives David Leon Gil
- Re: [openpgp] Intent to deprecate: Insecure primi… Ryan Carboni
- Re: [openpgp] Intent to deprecate: Insecure primi… Jon Callas
- Re: [openpgp] Intent to deprecate: Insecure primi… Peter Gutmann
- Re: [openpgp] Intent to deprecate: Insecure primi… Werner Koch
- Re: [openpgp] Intent to deprecate: Insecure primi… Derek Atkins
- Re: [openpgp] Intent to deprecate: Insecure primi… Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [openpgp] Intent to deprecate: Insecure primi… Bill Frantz
- Re: [openpgp] Intent to deprecate: Insecure primi… Falcon Darkstar Momot
- Re: [openpgp] Intent to deprecate: Insecure primi… Falcon Darkstar Momot
- Re: [openpgp] Intent to deprecate: Insecure primi… Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [openpgp] Intent to deprecate: Insecure primi… Bill Frantz
- Re: [openpgp] Intent to deprecate: Insecure primi… Derek Atkins
- Re: [openpgp] Intent to deprecate: Insecure primi… Derek Atkins
- Re: [openpgp] Intent to deprecate: Insecure primi… Andrew Skretvedt
- Re: [openpgp] Intent to deprecate: Insecure primi… ianG
- Re: [openpgp] Intent to deprecate: Insecure primi… ianG
- Re: [openpgp] Intent to deprecate: Insecure primi… Christoph Anton Mitterer
- Re: [openpgp] Intent to deprecate: Insecure primi… David Leon Gil
- Re: [openpgp] Intent to deprecate: Insecure primi… Christoph Anton Mitterer
- Re: [openpgp] Intent to deprecate: Insecure primi… ianG
- Re: [openpgp] Intent to deprecate: Insecure primi… Ben McGinnes
- Re: [openpgp] Intent to deprecate: Insecure primi… Tom Ritter
- [openpgp] Intent to deprecate: Insecure primitives David Leon Gil