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Re: [openpgp] Modelling an abuse-resistant OpenPGP keyserver

Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net> Mon, 15 April 2019 17:44 UTC

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From: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
To: Micah Lee <micah.lee@theintercept.com>, openpgp@ietf.org, Phil Pennock <ietf-phil-openpgp@spodhuis.org>, SKS development list <sks-devel@nongnu.org>
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Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 13:44:08 -0400
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Subject: Re: [openpgp] Modelling an abuse-resistant OpenPGP keyserver
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On Mon 2019-04-15 13:16:07 -0400, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> I've labeled the abuse-detection action you're describing as "identity
> monitoring" in draft -03.
 […]
> This is a useful insight, and i've tried to document it in -03 as well.
> I welcome text to improve it.

On Mon 2019-04-15 12:55:38 -0400, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> In -03, I've put Yaron and Kristian ahead of your name there,
[…]
> i've tried to describe your concerns in the "toxic data" section of
> draft -03.  I welcome further discussion on it.

Sigh.  Please excuse the typos, these should all read -02, not -03.
draft -03 does not exist yet.

I've just published draft -02, which is available at the usual places:

   https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-dkg-openpgp-abuse-resistant-keystore-02

   https://gitlab.com/dkg/draft-openpgp-abuse-resistant-keystore

substantive changes between -01 and -02:

 * distinguish different forms of flooding attack
 * distinguish toxic data as distinct from flooding
 * retrieval-time mitigations
 * user ID redaction
 * references to related work (CT, keylist, CONIKS, key transparency,
   ledgers/"blockchain", etc)
 * more details about UI/UX

The full text of the Markdown source for -02 is attached.

I welcome feedback and edits!

        --dkg

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