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Re: including the entire fingerprint of the issuer in an OpenPGP certification

"Daniel A. Nagy" <nagydani@epointsystem.org> Wed, 19 January 2011 11:37 UTC

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Message-ID: <4D36CCE7.4050505@epointsystem.org>
Date: Wed, 19 Jan 2011 12:37:11 +0100
From: "Daniel A. Nagy" <nagydani@epointsystem.org>
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CC: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, dkg@fifthhorseman.net
Subject: Re: including the entire fingerprint of the issuer in an OpenPGP certification
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Peter Gutmann wrote:
> "Daniel A. Nagy" <nagydani@epointsystem.org> writes:
> 
>> generating a new key with the same 64-bit key ID as an existing key is on the
>> very far end of the realm of feasibility.
> 
> That should be:
> 
>   generating a *secure* new key with the same 64-bit key ID as an existing key
>   is on the very far end of the realm of feasibility.
> 
> If you don't mind that your key's weak then it's not that much more work than
> just finding a 64-bit collision.

I disagree. It's not a collision that you are after, but a 64 bit pre-image.
Basically, you need to enumerate, on average, 2^63 possibilities, which is very
expensive.

Regards,

-- 
Daniel

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