Re: [openpgp] public logging of e-mail certificates [was: Re: OpenPGP private certification]

[Brian Sniffen <[e-mail]>]

> But I am not arguing for first com first served. I am arguing that the
> age of an endorsement is significant. An attacker can easily set up an
> endorsement cartel with 100 people signing each other's keys. But they
> can't backdate the endorsements to ten years before they decided they
> needed them.

I don't expect to understand most of the hashes in a log of hashed
signatures.  I wonder how many cloned subsets would be buried in case
they're later needed, and what can be done about that.  The best I can
think of is a transparency log---to not hash those. Big public signers
should offer such logs.  Private citizens signing each others keys
probably won't, but it's still valuable to have a standard format for
non-public endorsements.

Presumably keys should be able to carry a note indicating that
keysignatures should only be trusted if in a log.

-Brian

-- 
Brian Sniffen
"I reserve the right to evolve my views, and state that views I previously
 expressed may have been somewhere along the spectrum from insufficiently
 nuanced through ill-informed to dead wrong."