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Re: [openpgp] [PATCH] RFC4880bis: Argon2i

Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> Wed, 04 November 2015 00:33 UTC

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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: Nils Durner <ndurner@googlemail.com>
Thread-Topic: [openpgp] [PATCH] RFC4880bis: Argon2i
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Date: Wed, 04 Nov 2015 00:33:51 +0000
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References: <5623AA95.4060903@googlemail.com> <874mh3q3ol.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net> <56382F70.5000501@iang.org> <56385A38.6000707@googlemail.com> <9A043F3CF02CD34C8E74AC1594475C73F4B51C09@uxcn10-5.UoA.auckland.ac.nz>, <563924D5.6020407@googlemail.com>
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Subject: Re: [openpgp] [PATCH] RFC4880bis: Argon2i
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Nils Durner <ndurner@googlemail.com> writes:

>That is certainly one of the safest options for actual passwords, but gets in
>the way of symmetric keys (cheaply) being used as passphrases.

Hmm, yeah, but if you've already got a raw symmetric key (which won't need any
extra processing) I'd lean towards having it identified as such rather than
overloading a password-processing mechanism for it.  In other words make the
use for symmetric key transport explicit rather than relying on the
implementer to somehow know that S2K type X is meant to be used for symkey
transport.

So perhaps have type 4 = Argon2, type 5 = symmetric key transport, with a
safety note added to say that it's meant for randomly-generated symmetric keys
that are already, in effect, in the post-S2K state.

Peter.

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