[openpgp] Replacing the OpenPGP Encryption Mode is Harmful and Pointless
Bruce Walzer <bwalzer@59.ca> Fri, 15 July 2022 11:11 UTC
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Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2022 06:11:45 -0500
From: Bruce Walzer <bwalzer@59.ca>
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Subject: [openpgp] Replacing the OpenPGP Encryption Mode is Harmful and Pointless
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The article in question: * https://articles.59.ca/doku.php?id=pgpfan:no_new_ae This editorial fell out of a series of OpenPGP advocacy articles I wrote. The position: * The current OpenPGP encryption mode is secure and appropriate and should not be replaced. * The OpenPGP standard should not suggest or attempt to mandate that data that is suspected of malicious modification should be withheld from any entity. It is better to complete the operation and then provide the status. I realize that this is not at all a mainstream position to take. I am only posting this here in case it gains any traction. I don't want to blindside anyone. Bruce
- [openpgp] Replacing the OpenPGP Encryption Mode i… Bruce Walzer
- Re: [openpgp] Replacing the OpenPGP Encryption Mo… Daniel Huigens
- Re: [openpgp] Replacing the OpenPGP Encryption Mo… Bruce Walzer
- Re: [openpgp] Replacing the OpenPGP Encryption Mo… Daniel Huigens
- Re: [openpgp] Replacing the OpenPGP Encryption Mo… Wyllys Ingersoll
- Re: [openpgp] Replacing the OpenPGP Encryption Mo… Paul Schaub
- Re: [openpgp] Replacing the OpenPGP Encryption Mo… Bruce Walzer
- Re: [openpgp] Replacing the OpenPGP Encryption Mo… Daniel Huigens