Re: [OPSAWG] Kathleen Moriarty's No Objection on draft-ietf-opsawg-capwap-alt-tunnel-08: (with COMMENT)

On Tue, Oct 25, 2016 at 9:24 AM, Warren Kumari <warren@kumari.net> wrote:

> On Tue, Oct 25, 2016 at 2:41 PM, Duzongpeng <duzongpeng@huawei.com> wrote:
> > Hello,
> >
> >         I would like to give some suggestions as below.
> >
> >         Some operators deploys their WiFi networks with the data channel
> unsecured, and even for the wireless part, there are some unsecured
> deployment examples.
> >         It is not a good choice; however, it is simpler.
> >
> >         Of course, some secure ensured methods should also be provided.
> >         For the wireless part, IEEE has provided several secure
> mechanism;
> >         For the wireline part, IPsec can be deployed to protect the
> security.
> >
> >         Would it be ok for the draft to suggest that IPsec should be
> deployed if the tunnel type itself is unsecured.
>
>
> Personally I don't think that this is a useful suggestion -- *who*
> exactly would you be advising to do this? Users? They don't (and
> shouldn't have to) read the RFCs. Suggesting something which we know
> will not be used seems disingenuous - acknowledging that this is a
> real issue seems better than suggesting something which we know won't
> be done to users who we know are not reachable.
> W
>

For this draft and the protocol, we are more worried about MTI, not MTU so
that the option is there and traffic can be encrypted.  Then encouraging
the use of encryption is possible.

Kathleen

>
>
> >
> >
> > Best Regards
> > Zongpeng Du
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: OPSAWG [mailto:opsawg-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Kathleen
> Moriarty
> > Sent: Monday, October 24, 2016 12:57 AM
> > To: The IESG
> > Cc: opsawg-chairs@ietf.org; draft-ietf-opsawg-capwap-alt-tunnel@ietf.org;
> opsawg@ietf.org
> > Subject: [OPSAWG] Kathleen Moriarty's No Objection on
> draft-ietf-opsawg-capwap-alt-tunnel-08: (with COMMENT)
> >
> > Kathleen Moriarty has entered the following ballot position for
> > draft-ietf-opsawg-capwap-alt-tunnel-08: No Objection
> >
> > When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
> email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this
> introductory paragraph, however.)
> >
> >
> > Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.
> html
> > for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
> >
> >
> > The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
> > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-opsawg-capwap-alt-tunnel/
> >
> >
> >
> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> > COMMENT:
> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> >
> > I'm surprised to see security is optional and an assertion that RFCs
> published in 2009 covers everything.  Threats have evolved since then.
> > In looking at RFC5415, Section 12.1, I see:
> >
> >    Within CAPWAP, DTLS is used to secure the link between the WTP and
> >    AC.  In addition to securing control messages, it's also a link in
> >    this chain of trust for establishing link layer keys.  Consequently,
> >    much rests on the security of DTLS.
> >
> >     In some CAPWAP deployment scenarios, there are two channels between
> >    the WTP and AC: the control channel, carrying CAPWAP Control
> >    messages, and the data channel, over which client data packets are
> >    tunneled between the AC and WTP.  Typically, the control channel is
> >    secured by DTLS, while the data channel is not.
> >
> >    The use of parallel protected and unprotected channels deserves
> >    special consideration, but does not create a threat.  There are two
> >    potential concerns: attempting to convert protected data into
> >    unprotected data and attempting to convert un-protected data into
> >    protected data.  These concerns are addressed below.
> >
> > Wouldn't interception and tampering of that traffic pose a threat?  How
> about gaining access to the control channel?
> >
> > While I don't think this is the right draft to make changes for RFC5415,
> I don't think it's adequate to say the control channel is optional for
> encryption.  I could see how the data might be handled elsewhere.  The
> description discusses this as talking to hundreds of thousands of access
> points, isn't that access a threat?
> >
> > This draft allows for additional encapsulation methods, we could require
> encryption for these new encapsulation methods.
> >
> > This should probably be a discuss, so I would appreciate some discussion
> on this to see if we have option here or if something will change in the
> referenced RFCs soon.
> >
> > Thank you.
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > OPSAWG mailing list
> > OPSAWG@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/opsawg
>
>
>
> --
> I don't think the execution is relevant when it was obviously a bad
> idea in the first place.
> This is like putting rabid weasels in your pants, and later expressing
> regret at having chosen those particular rabid weasels and that pair
> of pants.
>    ---maf
>

-- 

Best regards,
Kathleen