Re: [OPSAWG] [TLS] CALL FOR ADOPTION: draft-reddy-opsawg-mud-tls

[Ben Schwartz <[e-mail]>]

Thanks for highlighting this, Michael.  I don't support adoption of this
draft, because I don't think it is fit-for-purpose.  Specifically, I think
it is likely to provide a significant advantage to malware authors (the
opposite of the intended effect).

Currently, if a malware author wants to match the TLS characteristics of
the host device, they have to do some work to characterize its TLS
behavior.  This may be difficult, especially in the case of partial
compromise, or for malware that targets a wide variety of hosts.  However,
with this MUD module in place, the malware can read the TLS behavior right
out of the MUD profile, and configure its behavior to match.

Note that, except in the case of TLS termination, the proxy cannot verify
anything about the TLS session by observing it.  Just because a connection
appears to use a particular SNI or certificate does not prove anything
about the actual destination.

On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 11:47 AM Michael Richardson <[e-mail]>
wrote:

> On 2020-09-02 11:05 a.m., Joe Clarke (jclarke) wrote:
> > Hello, opsawg.  This draft as underwent a number of revisions based on
> reviews and presentations at the last few IETF meetings.  The authors feel
> they have addressed the issues and concerns from the WG in their latest
> posted -05 revision.  As a reminder, this document describes how to use
> (D)TLS profile parameters with MUD to expose potential unauthorized
> software or malware on an endpoint.
> >
> > To that end, this serves as a two-week call for adoption for this work.
> Please reply with your support and/or comments by September 16, 2020.
>
> I have read the document in a number of different revisions, and I
> support adoption.
>
> I have been concerned that this document codifies a kind of TLS snooping
> by middle boxes which has in the past caused significant harm to
> development of TLS. (In particular, TLS version negotiation has had to
> evade existing middle box policies!)
>
> However,  this document seems to walk the fine line between causing
> protocol ossification and providing real security.  To the extent that
> it reduces the pressure by enterprises to invade the TLS encryption
> envelope through use of Enterprise certificates [is there a term for the
> activity describe in section 4.1? I wish there was] this document is a
> very useful thing.
>
> I would like to suggest that upon adoption, that this document go
> through a TLS WG review of some sort before OPSAWG does a WGLC.
>
>
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