[OPSAWG] Kathleen Moriarty's No Objection on draft-ietf-opsawg-capwap-alt-tunnel-08: (with COMMENT)

["Kathleen Moriarty" <[e-mail]>]

Kathleen Moriarty has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-opsawg-capwap-alt-tunnel-08: No Objection

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COMMENT:
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I'm surprised to see security is optional and an assertion that RFCs
published in 2009 covers everything.  Threats have evolved since then. 
In looking at RFC5415, Section 12.1, I see:

   Within CAPWAP, DTLS is used to secure the link between the WTP and
   AC.  In addition to securing control messages, it's also a link in
   this chain of trust for establishing link layer keys.  Consequently,
   much rests on the security of DTLS.
 
    In some CAPWAP deployment scenarios, there are two channels between
   the WTP and AC: the control channel, carrying CAPWAP Control
   messages, and the data channel, over which client data packets are
   tunneled between the AC and WTP.  Typically, the control channel is
   secured by DTLS, while the data channel is not.

   The use of parallel protected and unprotected channels deserves
   special consideration, but does not create a threat.  There are two
   potential concerns: attempting to convert protected data into
   unprotected data and attempting to convert un-protected data into
   protected data.  These concerns are addressed below.

Wouldn't interception and tampering of that traffic pose a threat?  How
about gaining access to the control channel?

While I don't think this is the right draft to make changes for RFC5415,
I don't think it's adequate to say the control channel is optional for
encryption.  I could see how the data might be handled elsewhere.  The
description discusses this as talking to hundreds of thousands of access
points, isn't that access a threat?  

This draft allows for additional encapsulation methods, we could require
encryption for these new encapsulation methods.

This should probably be a discuss, so I would appreciate some discussion
on this to see if we have option here or if something will change in the
referenced RFCs soon.

Thank you.