Re: [OPSEC] Erik Kline's No Objection on draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-eh-filtering-08: (with COMMENT)

Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Thu, 08 July 2021 02:00 UTC

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Date: Wed, 07 Jul 2021 19:00:20 -0700
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Erik Kline <ek.ietf@gmail.com>
Cc: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, opsec@ietf.org, opsec-chairs@ietf.org, evyncke@cisco.com, draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-eh-filtering@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [OPSEC] Erik Kline's No Objection on draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-eh-filtering-08: (with COMMENT)
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On Wed, Jun 30, 2021 at 10:03:48PM -0700, Erik Kline via Datatracker wrote:
> [S4.3.9.4] [comment]
> 
> * It seems fairly clear from RFC 5570 Security Considerations that a
>   CALIPSO option is best protected with an AH, and in such cases stripping
>   the CALIPSO option would cause the packet to fail validation at the
>   (suitably configured) destination.
> 
>   Similarly, it might be good to note in S4.3.9.5 that if an AH is present
>   presumably the advice from S3.4.5.5 applies.

Probably not very relevant here, but the current IPSECME advice is to use
ESP with null encryption rather than AH.

-Ben