[OPSEC] [opsec] considerations for and protection against misconfiguration attacks ?
Toerless Eckert <tte@cs.fau.de> Fri, 13 August 2021 17:42 UTC
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Date: Fri, 13 Aug 2021 19:41:57 +0200
From: Toerless Eckert <tte@cs.fau.de>
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Subject: [OPSEC] [opsec] considerations for and protection against misconfiguration attacks ?
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In the process of reviews for draft-ietf-bier-te, i ran into the question what the BCP are wrt. attacks via intentional misconfiguration. A) Is this somehing that should it be mentioned in security considerations ? I can not remember examples of misconfig attack in RFC security considerations. At least not for common issues that i can think of. But those would relate all to older standards. Maybe newer standards are better. Example would be nice. B) Do we have any guidance or even explicit specs in support of minimizing the risk of misconfigurations attacks ? For example, the attacks in under question where against misconfiguring routing via e.g.: static routes or similar functionality directly impacting local forwading plane. If i built a router where there is no such local CLI, but i would only make it available via e.g.: via authenticated NetConf, and the router infra was set up to not allow to change this (locked down hardware so to speak), this would significantly change the attack vector. Do we have anything like this in any specs or even as options in YANG models ? Cheers Toerless
- [OPSEC] [opsec] considerations for and protection… Toerless Eckert