Re: [OPSEC] minutes part 2

R Atkinson <ran.atkinson@gmail.com> Mon, 29 December 2008 18:08 UTC

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From: R Atkinson <ran.atkinson@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [OPSEC] minutes part 2
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On  23 Dec 2008, at 19:42, Vishwas Manral wrote:
> "After 2010, Federal agencies may use SHA-1 only for the following
> applications: hash-based message authentication codes (HMACs); key
> derivation functions (KDFs); and random number generators (RNGs). "
>
> So it seems in NIST view atleast SHA-1 with HMAC constructs is not
> affected to warrant a reccomendation to stop its use like for the
> other case.

Again, NIST by law is required to recommend something.
NIST only recommends NIST algorithms, which is why
they've kicked off the process to deprecate SHA and
select something else for their secure hashing.

The above quote is statement of policy, about what Federal
agencies may use in which situations.  It is not a claim
that any of those are "safe to use".  Separately that
quote does not support any claim that SHA is stronger
(or weaker) than some other algorithm in any particular
mode of operation.

Again, if you have an actual scientific referred openly
published paper comparing A and B, then please share it.

Until such a paper appears, we don't have the data to
make a scientific evaluation of which of several options
might be better or worse.

In any event, the IETF is global and is supposed to operate
based on science, not on the national policy of one country.

Cheers,

Ran

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