Re: [OPSEC] [Tsv-art] game over, EH [Tsvart last call review of draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-eh-filtering-06]

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Fri, 07 December 2018 20:59 UTC

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In-Reply-To: <B60C8071-9577-4935-A260-FAE0EF80AFCF@puck.nether.net>
From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Fri, 07 Dec 2018 12:59:09 -0800
Message-ID: <CABcZeBOZ4bQoT=FPa0vHfd9UZ8siqhh7w88xurNOqNpNyF_S=g@mail.gmail.com>
To: Jared Mauch <jared@puck.nether.net>
Cc: morrowc.lists@gmail.com, IETF discussion list <ietf@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-eh-filtering.all@ietf.org, heard@pobox.com, opsec@ietf.org, tsv-art@ietf.org, Gert Doering <gert@space.net>
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Subject: Re: [OPSEC] [Tsv-art] game over, EH [Tsvart last call review of draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-eh-filtering-06]
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On Fri, Dec 7, 2018 at 12:46 PM Jared Mauch <jared@puck.nether.net> wrote:

>
>
> > On Dec 7, 2018, at 12:10 AM, Christopher Morrow <morrowc.lists@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> > On Thu, Dec 6, 2018 at 5:41 PM Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
> >
> > routing area (key agility, a stronger algorithm than MD5). And of course
> TCP-AO doesn't attempt to provide privacy. Perhaps you can elaborate on
> what you're referring to here?
> >
> >
> > "TCP-AO is a lie, there is zero deployable code anywhere that supports
> it"
> >
> > was that the gist of his comment?
> > it'd be the whole of mine... because honestly it's the truth.
>
> I had written out a series of concerns around the requirements operators
> have.. I can’t find the paper around my office right now I wrote them on,
> but the went roughly like this:
>
> 1) We have long-lived TCP sessions, measured in years.  (Implied: many of
> the transport people really prefer stable routes without
> flapping/jitter/reordering from us)
> 2) We use protocols that are stable as a result as transports
> 3) Security area does review and says “why is MD5 still a thing” without
> considering #2 and #1 above
> 4) When doing routing things like an iBGP mesh, key rotation can be
> complex in a multivendor environment when the catastrophic failure of the
> network substrate is the consequence of a software bug
> 5) If these keys (md5) are in use, they’re not rotated because we got that
> support much later than the ability to set/rotate them and coordination
> with a network partner to rotate them is feasible but reaches operational
> impossibility.
> 6) We need protection from tampering with the transport, not encryption of
> the transport.  You will know where the routes go because I assume you’ve
> used a tool like traceroute before.
>

I think most of these points are reasonable (I'd quibble about #3) but
they're not very actionable.

If you're position is that TCP-MD5 is all you need (and maybe not even
that) then OK.

If what you want is some protocol with other, different, functions, then
you're going to need to be a lot clearer about what it is you *do* want,
not just what you *don't* want.

-Ekr