Re: [OSPF] Fw: New Version Notification for draft-manjuldtv-ospf-sequence-number-00.txt

["Acee Lindem (acee)" <[e-mail]>]

<Speaking as an OSPF WG member>

Hi Ramakrishna, 

So the attack is predicated on the following:

    1. The attacker is able to modify the right fields in the LSA to get
the desired behavior and still generate the same Fletcher checksum. This
is probably doable - have you done it?
    2. The attacker’s LSA reaches the originator (aka, the victim) after
it has responded to the attack and generated the LSA with the desired
sequence number. 
    3. The attackers’s LSA reaches other routers before the originator’s
LSA (which is probably only assured for routers downstream from the
attacker in the best case flooding graph rooted at the originator). If the
originator’s LSA reaches these routers first, it is ignored.

I must admit I’m not a big fan of the proposed change given that once a
router in the routing domain is compromised (including obtaining
authentication keys), there are many harmful attacks that may be levied
and this is just one of them. More importantly, you neglect the fact that
you’ll hasten the disruption caused by the sequence number advancing to
MaxSequenceNumber (which cannot be skipped).

In short, I think this is definitely a case where “the medicine is worse
than the cure.” 

Thanks,
Acee 

On 5/12/16, 7:09 AM, "OSPF on behalf of Ramakrishna DTV"
<[e-mail] on behalf of [e-mail]>
wrote:

>Hi Acee/Manav,
>
>I guess we were a little too brief in our description of the attack in
>the draft.
>
>The paper "Nakibly, G. et al, Persistent OSPF attacks, NDSS , 2012"
>discusses about multiple variants of the "Disguised LSA attack". I will
>describe
>one variant below.
>
>Some facts:
>
>Quoting from the paper:
>
>"Section 13.1 of the OSPF spec states that two instances of an LSA are
>considered identical if they have the same values in the following three
>fields:
>
>	Sequence Number, Checksum, and Age.
>
>In fact, two LSAs are considered identical even if their Age fields
>differ by up to 15 minutes (and the Sequence Number and Checksum
>fields are the same). The key point is that the spec considers these
>two LSAs to be the same even if the actual advertised links in the LSAs
>differ."
>
>Network setup:
>
>There are a set of routers in a routing domain.
>
>In this network 'C' is the compromised router. 'V' is the victim router.
>
>Intention: C intends to change an LSA of V without V fighting back.
>
>Here is a time-line of events:
>
>t0: V generated an LSA with sequence number 's' and all routers have it
>installed in their database including C.
>
>t1: C changes the LSA of V to sequence number 's+1' and floods it. The
>paper
>refers this as "trigger LSA".
>
>While this LSA is flooding the network, and it is on its way to V as
>well...
>
>t2: C changes the LSA of V to sequence number 's+2' and changes the LSA in
>such a way that checksum will be same as what V would have calculated. V
>then
>floods this "disguised LSA".
>
>(Note: The time-gap between t1 and t2 is governed by MinLSArrival of RFC
>2328.)
>
>t3: V receives LSA with sequence number 's+1' and as part of 'fight-back'
>mechanism reissues LSA with sequence number 's+2' and starts flooding.
>
>(Note that t3 may even be between t1 and t2 in some cases. But the attack
>still
>works in either case.)
>
>The important point now is that there are two LSAs in race for flooding in
>the network -- one prepared by C and other prepared by V.
>
>Both the LSAs have same values for the following values:
>
>	Sequence Number ('s+2'), Checksum, and Age.
>
>But note that their contents are different!
>
>Any receiving router (including victim V) will consider these as
>duplicates and
>installs the first one it receives.
>
>The point is that LSA with sequence number 's+2' will not trigger
>fight-back.
>Instead, it will be considered as a duplicate.
>
>The entire attack is made possible because C knows that V will generate
>LSA with
>sequence number 's+2' when it is fighting back an LSA with sequence
>number 's+1'.
>
>Note that at the end of the attack, some routers have the LSA as prepared
>by V.
>This is the correct LSA. The remaining routers will have the LSA as
>prepared by
>C. It is obvious that LSDB of this second set is effectively corrupted. An
>important point is that even those routers which got correct LSA, it is
>still
>troublesome because LSDB is not same across all the routers.
>Unsynchronized LSDB
>across routers cause routing issues.
>
>Gabi and co-authors have also provided a nice presentation which describes
>this attack in graphical form with little more detail (especially look at
>slides 14 to 20):
>
>	http://www.internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/P01_3.pdf
>
>Thanks and regards,
>Ramakrishna DTV.
>
>
>________________________________________
>From: Acee Lindem <[e-mail]>
>Sent: Thursday, May 12, 2016 4:33 PM
>To: Manav Bhatia
>Cc: Ramakrishna DTV; OSPF List; Manjul Khandelwal
>Subject: Re: [OSPF] Fw: New Version Notification for
>draft-manjuldtv-ospf-sequence-number-00.txt
>
>Hi Manav,
>> On May 12, 2016, at 1:11 AM, Manav Bhatia <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>
>> Hi DTV,
>>
>> Aha. Thanks for the catch !
>>
>> In that case, i dont understand why the "victim" will NOT generate a
>>new LSA with LS sequence number one past the received LS sequence
>>number. I see that the new attack tries to do something by updating the
>>sequence number and the checksum -- did not spend too much time on
>>trying to understand what exactly its doing there. However, OSPF also
>>has provisions to get around that, and i wrote about this many years ago
>>here:
>>
>> 
>>https://routingfreak.wordpress.com/2010/07/02/using-checksum-in-determini
>>ng-the-newer-lsa/
>>
>> So i have the same question as Acee -- why will the natural fight-back
>>mechanism not work here?
>
>It will and that was my point. I can think of only one possible attack
>where the same sequence number is used but the attacker can only change
>the contents of the LSA for OSPF routers for which it is in the flooding
>path from the originator.
>
>Thanks,
>Acee
>
>>
>> Cheers, Manav
>>
>> On Thu, May 12, 2016 at 10:18 AM, Ramakrishna DTV
>><[e-mail]> wrote:
>>
>> Hi Manav,
>>
>> Thank you for your comments.
>>
>> Gabi has published multiple attacks against OSPF.
>>
>> The attack we are targeting is published in
>>
>> @inproceedings{nakibly2012persistent,
>>   title={Persistent OSPF Attacks.},
>>   author={Nakibly, Gabi and Kirshon, Alex and Gonikman, Dima and Boneh,
>>Dan},
>>   booktitle={NDSS},
>>   year={2012}
>> }
>>
>> This attack indeed depends on predictability of sequence numbers.
>> On a side note, we even verified that fact with Gabi Nakibly himself
>> over a private mail.
>>
>> The attack you are discussing in your article is a different attack.
>> It was described by Gabi in great detail in a different paper:
>>
>> @inproceedings{nakibly2014ospf,
>>   title={OSPF vulnerability to persistent poisoning attacks: a
>>systematic analysis},
>>   author={Nakibly, Gabi and Sosnovich, Adi and Menahem, Eitan and
>>Waizel, Ariel and Elovici, Yuval},
>>   booktitle={Proceedings of the 30th Annual Computer Security
>>Applications Conference},
>>   pages={336--345},
>>   year={2014},
>>   organization={ACM}
>> }
>>
>> As you rightly mentioned, this attack does not depend upon sequence
>>number
>> predictability. But our draft is *not* targeting *this* attack.
>>
>> Thanks and regards,
>> Ramakrishna DTV.
>>
>>
>>
>> From: Manav Bhatia <[e-mail]>
>> Sent: Thursday, May 12, 2016 9:16 AM
>> To: Ramakrishna DTV
>> Cc: Acee Lindem (acee); Manjul Khandelwal; [e-mail]
>> Subject: Re: [OSPF] Fw: New Version Notification for
>>draft-manjuldtv-ospf-sequence-number-00.txt
>>
>> Hi DTV,
>>
>> I dont agree to your assessment of how the attack evades the "natural
>>fight-back mechanism" in OSPF.
>>
>> Its got *nothing* to do with the sequence numbers being predictable,
>>etc. I have explained in depth how the Gaby attack works here:
>>
>> 
>>https://routingfreak.wordpress.com/2013/09/09/how-bad-is-the-ospf-vulnera
>>bility-exposed-by-black-hat/
>> How bad is the OSPF vulnerability exposed by Black Hat ...
>> routingfreak.wordpress.com
>> I was asked a few weeks ago by our field engineers to provide a fix for
>>the OSPF vulnerability exposed by Black Hat last month. Prima facie
>>there appeared ...
>>
>>
>> Clipped from the blog:
>>
>> "This attack exploits a potential omission (or a bug if you will) in
>>the standard where it does not mandate that the receiving router
>>verifies that the Link State ID and the Advertising Router fields in the
>>Router LSA are the exact same value.
>>
>> This attack sends malacious Router LSAs with two different values in
>>the LS header. The Link State ID carries the Router ID of the router
>>that is being attacked (the victim) and the Advertising Router is set to
>>some different (any) value.
>>
>> When the victim receives the malacious Router LSA, it does not refresh
>>this LSA as it doesnt recognize this as its own self generated LSA. This
>>is because the OSPF spec clearly says in Sec 13.4 that “A
>>self-originated LSA is detected when either 1) The LSA’s Advertising
>>Router is equal to the router’s own Router ID or 2) the LSA is a network
>>LSA .. “.
>>
>> This means that OSPF’s natural fight back mechanism is NOT triggered by
>>the victim router as long as the field ‘Advertising Router’ of a LSA is
>>NOT equal to the victim’s Router ID. This is true even if the ‘Link
>>State ID’ of that LSA is equal to the victim’s Router ID. Going further
>>it means no LSA refresh is triggered even if the malacious LSA claims to
>>describe the links of the victim router!"
>>
>> I describe further in the blog that not all router implementations are
>>susceptible to the attack. Its dependent on how the LSA is picked up
>>from the LSDB.
>>
>> Cheers, Manav
>>
>> On Thu, May 12, 2016 at 7:59 AM, Ramakrishna DTV
>><[e-mail]> wrote:
>> Hi Acee,
>>
>> We currently provided the following description of this attack in the
>>draft:
>>
>>  "The paper refers to the attack as "Disguised LSA" and is of
>>    persistent nature.  This attack is launched from a compromised router
>>    inside a routing domain.  In this attack, the compromised router
>>    alters the LSA of an uncompromised router (victim).  Normally, such
>>    an attempt does not have persistence because the victim generates a
>>    new LSA when it sees such self-originated LSAs (referred to as
>>    "fight-back" mechanism in the paper).  But the paper makes disguised
>>    LSA persistent because all the fields { LS sequence number, checksum}
>>    are predictable.  It alters the existing LSA of victim to suit its
>>    needs but sets the sequence number to +1 of the existing LSA and
>>    alters the LSA so that checksum matches with checksum that would be
>>    generated by the victim when it generates the new LSA.  When this
>>    disguised LSA reaches the victim, it does not fight back because it
>>    compares only the fields { LS sequence number, checksum, age} to
>>    check for duplicates and not the actual content of LSA.
>>
>>    This attack enables an insider attacker to fully control the entire
>>    content of an LSA.  We think this attack is powerful."
>>
>> These details are currently present in Section 4, which is titled
>>"Implementation advice".
>> We can probably move it to a different section (e.g., "Introduction")
>>to make it clear.
>>
>> If you think even more additional details about the attack are useful
>>to the working group,
>> please let us know. We will add.
>>
>> Thank you.
>>
>> Regards,
>> Ramakrishna DTV.
>>
>>
>> ________________________________________
>> From: Acee Lindem (acee) <[e-mail]>
>> Sent: Wednesday, May 11, 2016 8:49 PM
>> To: Manjul Khandelwal; [e-mail]
>> Cc: Ramakrishna DTV
>> Subject: Re: [OSPF] Fw: New Version Notification for
>>draft-manjuldtv-ospf-sequence-number-00.txt
>>
>> Hi Manjul,
>>
>> Would it be possible to succinctly describe these “certain security
>> attacks” in the draft rather than expecting everyone to read the
>> referenced paper?
>>
>> Thanks,
>> Acee
>>
>> On 5/11/16, 10:19 AM, "OSPF on behalf of Manjul Khandelwal"
>> <[e-mail] on behalf of [e-mail]> wrote:
>>
>> >Hi,
>> >
>> >We have recently submitted a draft which deals with OSPF LS sequence
>> >number
>> >generation mechanism.
>> >
>> >Abstract of the draft:
>> >   The mechanism for LS sequence number generation as specified in RFC
>> >   2328 and RFC 5340 is completely predictable.  This makes it prone to
>> >   certain security attacks which exploit the predictable nature of LS
>> >   sequence numbers.  This draft updates the RFC 2328 to make LS
>> >   sequence number generation an implementation choice rather than a
>> >   fixed increment by 1 for successive LSAs.
>> >
>> >https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-manjuldtv-ospf-sequence-number/
>> >
>> >We solicit feedback/comments on the draft and request for adoption by
>>the
>> >OSPF working group.
>> >
>> >Regards,
>> >Manjul Khandelwal
>> >DTV Ramakrishna Rao
>> >________________________________________
>> >From: [e-mail] <[e-mail]>
>> >Sent: Monday, May 9, 2016 7:22 PM
>> >To: Manjul Khandelwal; Ramakrishna DTV
>> >Subject: New Version Notification for
>> >draft-manjuldtv-ospf-sequence-number-00.txt
>> >
>> >A new version of I-D, draft-manjuldtv-ospf-sequence-number-00.txt
>> >has been successfully submitted by Manjul Khandelwal and posted to the
>> >IETF repository.
>> >
>> >Name:           draft-manjuldtv-ospf-sequence-number
>> >Revision:       00
>> >Title:          OSPF LSA sequence number generation
>> >Document date:  2016-05-09
>> >Group:          Individual Submission
>> >Pages:          10
>> >URL:
>> 
>>>https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-manjuldtv-ospf-sequence-numbe
>>>r-
>> >00.txt
>> >Status:
>> >https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-manjuldtv-ospf-sequence-number/
>> >Htmlized:
>> >https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-manjuldtv-ospf-sequence-number-00
>> >
>> >
>> >Abstract:
>> >   The mechanism for LS sequence number generation as specified in RFC
>> >   2328 and RFC 5340 is completely predictable.  This makes it prone to
>> >   certain security attacks which exploit the predictable nature of LS
>> >   sequence numbers.  This draft updates the RFC 2328 to make LS
>> >   sequence number generation an implementation choice rather than a
>> >   fixed increment by 1 for successive LSAs.
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of
>> >submission
>> >until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>> >
>> >The IETF Secretariat
>> >
>> >_______________________________________________
>> >OSPF mailing list
>> >[e-mail]
>> >https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ospf
>>
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