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Re: [Patient] DOJ first on encryption services

Tony Rutkowski <tony@yaanatech.co.uk> Sun, 18 March 2018 12:30 UTC

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Reply-To: tony@yaanatech.co.uk
To: "Diego R. Lopez" <diego.r.lopez@telefonica.com>, Brian Witten <brian_witten@symantec.com>
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References: <02be9028-a8fd-f527-826b-5361de1470ce@yaanatech.co.uk> <F8164D9E-92C2-4440-BD06-6D81852918B8@telefonica.com>
From: Tony Rutkowski <tony@yaanatech.co.uk>
Organization: Yaana Limited
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Date: Sun, 18 Mar 2018 08:30:30 -0400
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Subject: Re: [Patient] DOJ first on encryption services
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Hi Diego,

It is also worth referencing a relatively recent Lawfare article on the 
scaling litigation in the U.S. against those supporting e2e encryption 
services or capabilities.
https://www.lawfareblog.com/did-congress-immunize-twitter-against-lawsuits-supporting-isis

This litigation trend is also likely to increase the insurance costs of 
providers.  Indeed, a provider that supports TLS1.3, QUIC, SNI, etc, may 
not even be able to get insurance.  It may be fun and games to play 
crypto rebel in venues like the IETF where the risk exposure is minimal, 
but when it comes to real world consequences and costs, the equations 
for providers are rather different.

--tony

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