Re: [Patient] [saag] Internet Draft posted as requested -

Roland Zink <roland@zinks.de> Tue, 19 December 2017 11:30 UTC

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From: Roland Zink <roland@zinks.de>
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Date: Tue, 19 Dec 2017 12:30:41 +0100
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Subject: Re: [Patient] [saag] Internet Draft posted as requested -
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Hi Stephen,


Am 18.12.2017 um 18:08 schrieb Stephen Farrell:
> Even with supposed "knowledge" (see the number 269 below),
> cookies and other bearer tokens mean that so-called visibility
> is the same as allowing impersonation unless one doesn't
> actually ever apply the mitm technology to the web. The chances
> of that seem to be zero to me.
Impersonation is what is done on the server side for example in CDNs. 
Your data may end in a different country than you think. Do you propose 
to stop such things only on the client side?

> And of course, many of the so-called "visibility" schemes,
> immediately do allow for endpoint impersonation for everything
> and not just bearer-token situations, whenever the middlebox
> so chooses, regardless of the language used to describe those
> schemes. Which brings us back to them being no better than the
> current ickky corporate mitm root-ca stuff.
>
And the server is even allowed to instruct my browser to tell 3rd 
parties what I'm doing. The referer header is used for pervasive 
monitoring. There is not only a end-to-end connection instead there 
could be many. The end user should have control over them but is not 
even notified.


Regards,
Roland