[Patient] DOJ first on encryption services

Tony Rutkowski <tony@yaanatech.co.uk> Sun, 18 March 2018 11:20 UTC

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From: Tony Rutkowski <tony@yaanatech.co.uk>
Reply-To: tony@yaanatech.co.uk
To: Brian Witten <brian_witten@symantec.com>
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Organization: Yaana Limited
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Date: Sun, 18 Mar 2018 07:20:04 -0400
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Subject: [Patient] DOJ first on encryption services
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Hi Brian,


This action announced on Thursday by the US Attorney's office is a 
first.  It suggests the US Feds will be going after companies who cater 
to the wrong customers with encryption services.

It seems likely that most countries, providers, and enterprises will 
simply block or degrade TLS 1.3, QUIC, and other pervasive encryption 
protocols. However, there will always be outliers who will take the risk.

This DOJ action (and likely clones elsewhere in the world) adds some 
greater risk to the equation when the provider fails to undertake due 
diligence on the uses being undertaken by the customers running TLS 1.3 
and QUIC servers.  Where the customer is using the technology to evade 
law enforcement, including DCMA strictures, the provider may find 
themselves complicit through criminal or civil proceedings.


ps. They probably will not come after those developing the standards, 
but then the IESG probably has sufficient liability insurance courtesy 
of ISOC to handle litigation costs and fines.