Re: [Patient] Internet Draft posted as requested -

[Roland Zink <[e-mail]>]

Hi Brian,


My two cents to this. When you are a endpoint you shouldn't trust the 
other endpoint or the network. When you are part of the network you 
shouldn't trust endpoints and probably other parts of the network. 
Especially TLS/HTTPS doesn't protect endpoints from malicous servers.


I even want to extend this from a end users point of view. In todays 
world the end user often can't control what the endpoint is doing. So 
instead of only protecting endpoints from incoming messages also the 
outgoing messages should be looked at if they break for example the 
users privacy. This can be something like removing the referer header or 
dropping audio recordings taken unnoticed by some phone, tv, tablet, 
laptop, digital assistant or whatever.


That said I'm not sure if a network element decrypting the transport 
encryption can really protect assuming that parties which want to talk 
secretely will use an additional level of encryption to prevent the 
decryption.


Regards,

Roland


Am 14.12.2017 um 00:55 schrieb Brian Witten:
> Hi Everyone,
>
> With the Wired article last week ( https://www.wired.com/story/phishing-schemes-use-encrypted-sites-to-seem-legit/ ) ... I wanted to get the Internet Draft ( https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-witten-protectingendpoints-00.txt ) posted publicly for others to comment sooner rather than later.  Of course, feel free to comment here on the list or just me comments 1:1 at [e-mail].  Thank You Either Way!
>
> Looking Forward,
> Brian
>                           
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