[Pce] Alvaro Retana's No Objection on draft-ietf-pce-lsp-control-request-09: (with COMMENT)

[Alvaro Retana via Datatracker <[e-mail]>]

Alvaro Retana has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-pce-lsp-control-request-09: No Objection

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COMMENT:
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I have a substantive comment and then some nits/editorial notes.

(1) It seems to me that any PCE can request control of an LSP.  Even if the
sessions are authenticated and encrypted, how does the PCC determine if it's ok
for the requesting PCE to ask for control?  §8.1 says that an "implementation
SHOULD allow the operator to configure the policy based on which it honors the
request to control the LSPs".  If the implementation doesn't allow the
configuration of policy, then it is possible for a rogue PCE to ask for control
of an LSP, and for the PCC to grant it.  Why is the ability to configure this
policy not REQUIRED?  I believe this case should be explicitly called out as a
vulnerability.

(2) Abstract: s/A Path Computation Client (PCC) has set up LSPs/A Path
Computation Client (PCC) that has set up LSPs

(3) §1: s/which PCE to delegate the orphaned LSP/which PCE to delegate the
orphaned LSP to

(4) §1: s/a simple extension, by using this a PCE can/a simple extension, by
using it a PCE can

(5) In §3 the new C Flag is called the "LSP-Control Request Flag", but §7.1
only uses "LSP-Control".  Please be consistent; the more descriptive name is
probably better.