Re: [Pce] Roman Danyliw's Discuss on draft-ietf-pce-stateful-pce-p2mp-12: (with DISCUSS)
Roman Danyliw <rdd@cert.org> Fri, 12 April 2019 12:28 UTC
Return-Path: <rdd@cert.org>
X-Original-To: pce@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pce@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 31E2C1202C5; Fri, 12 Apr 2019 05:28:54 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=cert.org
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 8ivMUb0hBkWo; Fri, 12 Apr 2019 05:28:51 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from taper.sei.cmu.edu (taper.sei.cmu.edu [147.72.252.16]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 350CF1201B2; Fri, 12 Apr 2019 05:28:50 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from korb.sei.cmu.edu (korb.sei.cmu.edu [10.64.21.30]) by taper.sei.cmu.edu (8.14.7/8.14.7) with ESMTP id x3CCSeSK014882; Fri, 12 Apr 2019 08:28:40 -0400
DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 taper.sei.cmu.edu x3CCSeSK014882
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=cert.org; s=yc2bmwvrj62m; t=1555072121; bh=ZZrlRSY0i6CZBUo9LwdLQhoIKvcN43p+zqRr3YkdJRg=; h=From:To:CC:Subject:Date:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=OaOd+cmHVdzos8cPzstj2eRzc4+uFuGqbXDMkeCPIfnZoSMaOBdn9rapYpIJ9VQ78 Crk9T77l9E65wcOmhZw1X8Zc6NgdxR9SiEkEaLyjYYm8MNkJuZTIjEZpwnXmOTZtOG RHMb4pKDQbwwAXufpimD/BVykICe0jCVROc8FSZU=
Received: from CASSINA.ad.sei.cmu.edu (cassina.ad.sei.cmu.edu [10.64.28.249]) by korb.sei.cmu.edu (8.14.7/8.14.7) with ESMTP id x3CCSVch003614; Fri, 12 Apr 2019 08:28:31 -0400
Received: from MARCHAND.ad.sei.cmu.edu ([10.64.28.251]) by CASSINA.ad.sei.cmu.edu ([10.64.28.249]) with mapi id 14.03.0435.000; Fri, 12 Apr 2019 08:28:30 -0400
From: Roman Danyliw <rdd@cert.org>
To: Dhruv Dhody <dhruv.dhody@huawei.com>, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
CC: "draft-ietf-pce-stateful-pce-p2mp@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-pce-stateful-pce-p2mp@ietf.org>, "pce@ietf.org" <pce@ietf.org>, "pce-chairs@ietf.org" <pce-chairs@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Pce] Roman Danyliw's Discuss on draft-ietf-pce-stateful-pce-p2mp-12: (with DISCUSS)
Thread-Index: AQHU76ntQr0ahYBHQUivFIUWFCvqGKY2qC8AgAHOpMA=
Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 12:28:29 +0000
Message-ID: <359EC4B99E040048A7131E0F4E113AFC01B332A3B7@marchand>
References: <155490660734.22896.13528098840634992626.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> <23CE718903A838468A8B325B80962F9B8DA107E0@BLREML503-MBS.china.huawei.com>
In-Reply-To: <23CE718903A838468A8B325B80962F9B8DA107E0@BLREML503-MBS.china.huawei.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach:
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator:
x-originating-ip: [10.64.22.6]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
MIME-Version: 1.0
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/pce/bCwTmY59kteSxUvjUo4yTmkFM2o>
Subject: Re: [Pce] Roman Danyliw's Discuss on draft-ietf-pce-stateful-pce-p2mp-12: (with DISCUSS)
X-BeenThere: pce@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: Path Computation Element <pce.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pce>, <mailto:pce-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/pce/>
List-Post: <mailto:pce@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pce-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pce>, <mailto:pce-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 12:28:54 -0000
Hi! > -----Original Message----- > From: Dhruv Dhody [mailto:dhruv.dhody@huawei.com] > Sent: Thursday, April 11, 2019 12:52 AM > To: Roman Danyliw <rdd@cert.org>; The IESG <iesg@ietf.org> > Cc: draft-ietf-pce-stateful-pce-p2mp@ietf.org; pce@ietf.org; pce- > chairs@ietf.org > Subject: RE: [Pce] Roman Danyliw's Discuss on draft-ietf-pce-stateful-pce- > p2mp-12: (with DISCUSS) > > Hi Ramon, > > Thanks for your review. > > Here is the proposed update - > > 12. Security Considerations > > The stateful operations on P2MP TE LSPs are more CPU-intensive and > also utilize more bandwidth on wire (in comparison to P2P TE LSPs). > If a rogue PCC were able to request unauthorized stateful PCE > operations then it may be able to mount a DoS attack against a PCE, > which would disrupt the network and deny service to other PCCs. > Similarly an attacker may flood the PCC with PCUpd messages at a rate > that exceeds either the PCC's ability to process them or the > network's ability to signal the changes, by either spoofing messages > or compromising the PCE itself. > > Consequently, it is important that implementations conform to the > relevant security requirements as listed below - > > o As per [RFC8231], it is RECOMMENDED that these PCEP extensions > only be activated on authenticated and encrypted sessions across > PCEs and PCCs belonging to the same administrative authority, > using Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC8253], as per the > recommendations and best current practices in [RFC7525] (unless > explicitly set aside in [RFC8253]). > > o Security considerations for path computation requests and > responses are as per [RFC8306]. > > o Security considerations for stateful operations (such as state > report, synchronization, delegation, update, etc.) are as per > [RFC8231]. > > o Security considerations for LSP instantiation mechanism are as per > [RFC8231]. > > o Security considerations as stated in Section 10.1, Section 10.6, > and Section 10.7 of [RFC5440] continue to apply. This text is very clear and addresses my concerns. I see that it is in -13 so I'll clear the DISCUSS. Thank you for this change. Roman > > More inline - > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Pce [mailto:pce-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Roman Danyliw via > > Datatracker > > Sent: 10 April 2019 20:00 > > To: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org> > > Cc: draft-ietf-pce-stateful-pce-p2mp@ietf.org; pce@ietf.org; pce- > > chairs@ietf.org > > Subject: [Pce] Roman Danyliw's Discuss on draft-ietf-pce-stateful-pce- > > p2mp-12: (with DISCUSS) > > > > Roman Danyliw has entered the following ballot position for > > draft-ietf-pce-stateful-pce-p2mp-12: Discuss > > > > When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all > > email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut > > this introductory paragraph, however.) > > > > > > Please refer to > > https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html > > for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions. > > > > > > The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here: > > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-pce-stateful-pce-p2mp/ > > > > > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > DISCUSS: > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > The Security Considerations section has numerous helpful and > > appropriate references. Thanks for tracking them down. However, > > explicit, additional text is required to help identify, de-duplicate > > and deconflict the “relevant guidance” provided by them. > > > > (1) Per “it is important that implementations conform to the relevant > > security requirements of [RFC5440], [RFC8306] and [RFC8231], and > > [RFC8281]”: > > > > ** [RFC8231] says “RECOMMENDED that these PCEP extensions only be > > activated on authenticated and encrypted sessions across PCEs and PCCs > > belonging to the same administrative authority, using Transport Layer > > Security (TLS) [PCEPS], as per the recommendations and best current > > practices in [RFC7525]”. Good language. > > This draft again re-states “Securing the PCEP session using Transport > > Layer Security (TLS) [RFC8253], as per the recommendations and best > > current practices in [RFC7525], is RECOMMENDED.” Why say that twice? > > Is there something new there? > > > > [[Dhruv Dhody]] Used the text from RFC8231. > > > ** Per Section 10.4 of RFC5440 from 2009, IPSec is a MAY and Section > > 10.2 makes > > TCP-MD5 a MUST. The more recent (2017) RFC8306 and RFC8253 > reference > > TLS and TCP-AO, no IPSec. RFC8306 explicitly says don’t use TCP-MD5. > > What is the RECOMMENDED approach today? > > > > (2) Per “[s]ecuring the PCEP session using Transport Layer Security > > (TLS) [RFC8253], as per the recommendations and best current practices > > in [RFC7525], is RECOMMENDED”, how should the guidance on both of > these > > drafts be synthesized? > > [[Dhruv Dhody]] Added "(unless explicitly set aside in [RFC8253])". > > > Specifically, this sentence is unclear on whether the the robust TLS > > 1.2 requirements in Section 3.4 of RFC8253 are RECOMMENDED, and/or > > whether the Security Considerations/Section 7 of RFC8253, which > > undermine these robust requirements by saying administrators MAY allow > > the usage weak ciphersuites, apply. > > [[Dhruv Dhody]] Section 3.4 of RFC8253 says - > > * Negotiation of a ciphersuite providing for confidentiality is > RECOMMENDED. > > Then, Section 7 says - > > Some TLS ciphersuites only provide integrity validation of their > payload and provide no encryption; such ciphersuites SHOULD NOT be > used by default. Administrators MAY allow the usage of these > ciphersuites after careful weighting of the risk of relevant internal > data leakage that can occur in such a case, as explicitly stated by > [RFC6952]. > > The 'MAY' in the above text is to optionally allow going against something > that is 'RECOMMENDED' with a suitable guidance. In my reading that is > okay. Am I missing something? > > > This > > sentence also cites RFC7525 which makes statements that weak > > (NULL) cipher suites MUST NOT be negotiated in contradiction to the > > RFC8253 Section 7 guidance. > > > [[Dhruv Dhody]] This is taken care by "(unless explicitly set aside in > [RFC8253])" in the proposed update. > > > Given the discussion of TLs, some additional treatment of TLS v1.3 is > > needed, recognizing that RFC7525 does recommend “v1.2+” > > > [[Dhruv Dhody]] Both RFC8253 and RFC7525 say TLS1.2 or later; not sure if > we need to say more in this I-D (a very specific P2MP extension). > > > Again, there is helpful guidance across all of the references. Please > > provide more textually narrative about which specific sections apply > > on the references. > > > > > [[Dhruv Dhody]] See proposed text. > > If the new text needs further changes, it would be very helpful if you could > include the changes you would like to see. > > Thanks for your review! > > Regards! > Dhruv > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Pce mailing list > > Pce@ietf.org > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pce
- [Pce] Roman Danyliw's Discuss on draft-ietf-pce-s… Roman Danyliw via Datatracker
- Re: [Pce] Roman Danyliw's Discuss on draft-ietf-p… Dhruv Dhody
- Re: [Pce] Roman Danyliw's Discuss on draft-ietf-p… Roman Danyliw