Re: [Pce] Eric Rescorla's Discuss on draft-ietf-pce-rfc6006bis-03: (with DISCUSS)
Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Thu, 31 August 2017 12:47 UTC
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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Thu, 31 Aug 2017 06:47:05 -0600
Message-ID: <CABcZeBMYziPTDkc5s09yvuBDvkV9d8EHXOtBgZgabWdfvukD2g@mail.gmail.com>
To: Dhruv Dhody <dhruv.dhody@huawei.com>
Cc: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, "draft-ietf-pce-rfc6006bis@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-pce-rfc6006bis@ietf.org>, "pce@ietf.org" <pce@ietf.org>, "pce-chairs@ietf.org" <pce-chairs@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Pce] Eric Rescorla's Discuss on draft-ietf-pce-rfc6006bis-03: (with DISCUSS)
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No, not really. You're still citing to 5440 which has the TCP-MD5 stuff, and there's no requirement to use AO. I think what's needed here is a normative requirement for something strong than TCP-MD5. I defer to the WG on what that should be, but it's really not OK to keep using TCP-MD5 as our basic security measure for TCP connections for routing protocols -Ekr On Thu, Aug 31, 2017 at 12:36 AM, Dhruv Dhody <dhruv.dhody@huawei.com> wrote: > Hi Eric, > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Pce [mailto:pce-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Eric Rescorla > > Sent: 31 August 2017 05:12 > > To: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org> > > Cc: draft-ietf-pce-rfc6006bis@ietf.org; pce@ietf.org; > pce-chairs@ietf.org > > Subject: [Pce] Eric Rescorla's Discuss on draft-ietf-pce-rfc6006bis-03: > > (with DISCUSS) > > > > Eric Rescorla has entered the following ballot position for > > draft-ietf-pce-rfc6006bis-03: Discuss > > > > When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all > > email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this > > introductory paragraph, however.) > > > > > > Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria. > html > > for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions. > > > > > > The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here: > > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-pce-rfc6006bis/ > > > > > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > DISCUSS: > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > The Security Considerations is worrisome, as it points to RFC 5440; > > Section 10.2, which basically recommends TCP-MD5: > > > > At the time of writing, TCP-MD5 [RFC2385] is the only available > > security mechanism for securing the TCP connections that underly PCEP > > sessions. > > > > As explained in [RFC2385], the use of MD5 faces some limitations and > > does not provide as high a level of security as was once believed. A > > PCEP implementation supporting TCP-MD5 SHOULD be designed so that > > stronger security keying techniques or algorithms that may be > > specified for TCP can be easily integrated in future releases. > > > > The TCP Authentication Option [TCP-AUTH] (TCP-AO) specifies new > > security procedures for TCP, but is not yet complete. Since it is > > believed that [TCP-AUTH] will offer significantly improved security > > for applications using TCP, implementers should expect to update > > their implementation as soon as the TCP Authentication Option is > > published as an RFC. > > > > Implementations MUST support TCP-MD5 and should make the security > > function available as a configuration option. > > > > TCP-AO has now been published as an RFC for quite some time, so it's > > probably not really appropriate to just point to a document which > > recommends TCP-MD5. > > > [[Dhruv Dhody]] Let me know if this change is okay - > > OLD: > 5. Security Considerations > > As described in [RFC5862], P2MP path computation requests are more > CPU-intensive and also utilize more link bandwidth. In the event of > an unauthorized P2MP path computation request, or a denial of service > attack, the subsequent PCEP requests and processing may be disruptive > to the network. Consequently, it is important that implementations > conform to the relevant security requirements of [RFC5440] that > specifically help to minimize or negate unauthorized P2MP path > computation requests and denial of service attacks. These mechanisms > include: > > o Securing the PCEP session requests and responses using TCP > security techniques (Section 10.2 of [RFC5440]). > > o Authenticating the PCEP requests and responses to ensure the > message is intact and sent from an authorized node (Section 10.3 > of [RFC5440]). > > o Providing policy control by explicitly defining which PCCs, via IP > access-lists, are allowed to send P2MP path requests to the PCE > (Section 10.6 of [RFC5440]). > > PCEP operates over TCP, so it is also important to secure the PCE and > PCC against TCP denial of service attacks. Section 10.7.1 of > [RFC5440] outlines a number of mechanisms for minimizing the risk of > TCP based denial of service attacks against PCEs and PCCs. > > PCEP implementations SHOULD consider the additional security provided > by Transport Layer Security (TLS) [I-D.ietf-pce-pceps]. > NEW: > 5. Security Considerations > > As described in [RFC5862], P2MP path computation requests are more > CPU-intensive and also utilize more link bandwidth. In the event of > an unauthorized P2MP path computation request, or a denial of service > attack, the subsequent PCEP requests and processing may be disruptive > to the network. Consequently, it is important that implementations > conform to the relevant security requirements that specifically help > to minimize or negate unauthorized P2MP path computation requests and > denial of service attacks. These mechanisms include: > > o Securing the PCEP session requests and responses using TCP > security techniques such as TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO) > [RFC5925] or using Transport Layer Security (TLS) [I-D.ietf-pce- > pceps], as per the recommendations and best current practices in > [RFC7525]. > > o Authenticating the PCEP requests and responses to ensure the > message is intact and sent from an authorized node using TCP-AO or > TLS. > > o Providing policy control by explicitly defining which PCCs, via IP > access-lists, are allowed to send P2MP path requests to the PCE > (Section 10.6 of [RFC5440]). > > PCEP operates over TCP, so it is also important to secure the PCE and > PCC against TCP denial of service attacks. Section 10.7.1 of > [RFC5440] outlines a number of mechanisms for minimizing the risk of > TCP based denial of service attacks against PCEs and PCCs. > END > > Thanks, > Dhruv > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Pce mailing list > > Pce@ietf.org > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pce > >
- [Pce] Eric Rescorla's Discuss on draft-ietf-pce-r… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [Pce] Eric Rescorla's Discuss on draft-ietf-p… Dhruv Dhody
- Re: [Pce] Eric Rescorla's Discuss on draft-ietf-p… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [Pce] Eric Rescorla's Discuss on draft-ietf-p… Dhruv Dhody