[pcp] Stephen Farrell's Discuss on draft-ietf-pcp-authentication-13: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

"Stephen Farrell" <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> Thu, 09 July 2015 14:48 UTC

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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
To: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
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Date: Thu, 09 Jul 2015 07:48:06 -0700
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Subject: [pcp] Stephen Farrell's Discuss on draft-ietf-pcp-authentication-13: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

Stephen Farrell has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-pcp-authentication-13: Discuss

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DISCUSS:
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- Why didn't you choose to encrypt the PCP payloads after
you've got a shared secret?


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COMMENT:
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Thanks for getting this done.


- How would this work in a home network where the f/w is not
managed by the ISP and there'd otherwise be no EAP
infrastructure? That could be out-of-scope or require some
new/odd EAP implementation and no change to this protocol, and
that is probably fine, but I do wonder. 

- 3.3: Is this really needed? I wonder if we could do without
it. The protocol would be simpler if this wasn't needed and
simpler == more-secure in general.

- 5.11: would s/issued the credentials/issued the EAP
credentials that will be used to authenticate the client/ be
better? As-is, it's a tiny bit confusing maybe.

- 6.2: Maybe this is being overly paranoid, but would it be
worth saying that in all failure cases when you say discard the
message, you mean to not process it's content?  With a very
perverse reading of the current text, I might be able to argue
that I could process the message content first and only then
check the authentication afterwards. Yes, that'd be fairly
spectacularly dim, but that kind of thing does sometimes
happen. (If there's a better place in the draft to put some
text on that, that's just fine.)

[pcp] Stephen Farrell's Discuss on draft-ietf-pcp… Stephen Farrell