Re: [Perc] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-perc-double-10

[Alissa Cooper <[e-mail]>]

Russ, thanks for your review. Richard, thanks for your response. I entered a Yes ballot. The IANA registration looks fine to me — we did the early registration with just the same fields as specified in the document.

Alissa

> On Dec 19, 2018, at 11:46 AM, Richard Barnes <[e-mail]> wrote:
> 
> Thanks for the review, Russ.  Comments below (nothing major); pull request here for your review:
> 
> https://github.com/ietf/perc-wg/pull/163 <https://github.com/ietf/perc-wg/pull/163>
> 
> On Sat, Oct 20, 2018 at 4:24 AM Russ Housley <[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
> Reviewer: Russ Housley
> Review result: Almost Ready
> 
> I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. The General Area
> Review Team (Gen-ART) reviews all IETF documents being processed
> by the IESG for the IETF Chair.  Please treat these comments just
> like any other last call comments.
> 
> For more information, please see the FAQ at
> <http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq <http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>>.
> 
> Document: draft-ietf-perc-double-10
> Reviewer: Russ Housley
> Review Date: 2018-10-20
> IETF LC End Date: 2018-11-01 
> IESG Telechat date: unknown
> 
> Summary: Almost Ready
> 
> 
> Major Concerns:
> 
> Section 10: Doesn't the IANA registry needs to specify the PRF to be
> used with the ciphersuite as well?
> 
> I don't think so.  I don't see a slot in the relevant registry for that, and the tabular summary in the IANA considerations section is really just a courtesy.
> 
> https://www.iana.org/assignments/srtp-protection/srtp-protection.xhtml#srtp-protection-1 <https://www.iana.org/assignments/srtp-protection/srtp-protection.xhtml#srtp-protection-1>
>  
> 
> Minor Concerns:
> 
> Section 3: It would be useful to explain the Master Key before the
> reader gets to Section 3.1.
> 
> Note that the "master key" concept comes from SRTP.  I've added a bit of text to clarify.
> 
>  
> Section 3.1: It is unclear what assistance is provided by the
> additional level of indirection:
> 
>          PRF_double_n(k_master,x) = PRF_inner_(n/2)(k_master,x) ||
>                                     PRF_outer_(n/2)(k_master,x)
> 
>          PRF_inner_n(k_master,x)  = PRF_n(inner(k_master),x)
>          PRF_outer_n(k_master,x)  = PRF_n(outer(k_master),x)
> 
> It could just say:
> 
>          PRF_double_n(k_master,x) = PRF_(n/2)(inner(k_master),x) ||
>                                     PRF_(n/2)(outer(k_master),x)
> 
> 👍  
> 
> Not sure what I was thinking.
> 
>  
> Section 4: I suggest:
> 
>         If the marker bit is not present, then B MUST be set to zero.
> 
> 👍
>  
> Section 5, 1st paragraph: and endpoint cannot verify confidentiality.
> 
> Well, it can verify that the packet was encrypted with a key known only to the endpoints.  But OK.
>  
> 
> Nits:
> 
> The document uses "encryption" and "confidentiality" interchanagably.
> Encryption is a mechanism or algorithm.  Confidentiality is a security
> service.  While I do not think that the reader will be confused by the
> current wording, it would be better to use the terms properly.  In
> addition, it is misleading to say:
> 
>    ... the receiving endpoint that can encrypt and authenticate ....
> 
> because the sending endpoint encrypts, and the recieving endpoints
> decrypts.  Also, the receiving endpoints check the authentication tag.
> 
> That's actually just some bad grammar.  Reworded.
> 
>  
> Abstract: s/authenticated encryption with associated data/
>            /authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD)/
> 
> Abstract: s/scheme/algorithm/
> 
> Section 5.2: s/GCM/AES-GCM/
> 
> Section 7: s/HBH/hop-by-hop/
> 
> Section 7: s/E2E/end-to-end/
> 
> Section 7.1: s/HBH/hop-by-hop/
> 
> Section 7.2: The text is redundant.  I suggest "etc" be dropped from
> "such as SSRC, SEQ, CSRC, etc"
> 
> Section 7.2: s/non primary/non-primary/
> 
> Section 7.3: s/HBH/hop-by-hop/
> 
> Implemented all of the above...
>  
> Appendix A: s/HBH/hop-by-hop/
> 
> Appendix A: s/E2E/end-to-end/
> 
> ... but I'm going to leave these last two as-is, for brevity. 
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