Re: [perpass] RSA-OAEP

Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> Wed, 20 November 2013 19:01 UTC

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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Date: Wed, 20 Nov 2013 14:00:52 -0500
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To: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
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Subject: Re: [perpass] RSA-OAEP
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OpenSSL supports RSA-OAEP and RSA-PSS.  See the latest documentation for the 'cms' command for details.  At present, PSS-only and OAEP-only keys in certificates are not supported.

Russ


On 11/20/2013 05:18 PM, Richard Barnes wrote:
> That makes sense.  Would you say the same in the signature domain, i.e.,
> PKCS#1 v1.5 -> PSS?
> 
> 
> On Wed, Nov 20, 2013 at 12:07 PM, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> wrote:
> 
>> I do not know of any place where RSA-OAEP has been called out as the
>> mandatory to implement algorithm, but there are many places where PKCS#1
>> v1.5 still enjoys this status.  I suggest we make RSA-OAEP the mandatory to
>> implement algorithm in our specifications.
>> 
>> Russ
>> 
>> 
>> On Nov 20, 2013, at 11:09 AM, Richard Barnes wrote:
>> 
>> What are you proposing be done, besides supporting OAEP in new specs or
>> back-porting it to old ones?  In order to make people use OAEP, we would
>> need to call in the protocol police.
>> 
>> 
>> On Wed, Nov 20, 2013 at 10:49 AM, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>wrote:
>> 
>>> We have known for a ver long time that PKCS #1 Version 1.5 (see RFC 2313)
>>> is vulnerable to adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks when applied for
>>> encryption purposes.  Exploitation reveals the result of a particular RSA
>>> decryption, requires access to an oracle which will respond to a hundreds
>>> of thousands of ciphertexts), which are constructed adaptively in response
>>> to previously-received replies providing information on the successes or
>>> failures of attempted decryption operations.  As a result, the attack
>>> appears significantly less feasible to perpetrate in store-and-forward
>>> environments than for interactive ones.
>>> 
>>> PKCS #1 Version 2.0 and Version 2.1 (see RFC 3447) include RSA-OAEP to
>>> address this situation, but we have seen very little movement toward
>>> RSA-OAEP.  While we are reviewing algorithm choices in light of the
>>> pervasive surveillance situation, I think we should take the time to
>>> address known vulnerabilities like this one.  If we don't, then we are
>>> leaving an partially open door for a well funded attacker.
>>> 
>>> Russ
>>> _______________________________________________
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