Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response-01

SM <> Fri, 06 December 2013 09:36 UTC

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Date: Fri, 06 Dec 2013 01:20:17 -0800
To: Pranesh Prakash <>
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Subject: Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response-01
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Hi Pranesh,
At 20:53 05-12-2013, Pranesh Prakash wrote:
>This is not a debate about whether surveillance is good or not.
>(Targetted surveillance which is allowed by a law, has a legitimate aim
>in a democratic society, is not arbitrary, is necessary to achieve those
>aims, is proportionate, authorized by a judicial process, etc., would be
>legitimate.)  This is a debate about whether it is technically (and
>politically) desirable for protocols to prevent mass surveillance.

I read 
There are likely similar cases in other countries.

What could be the effect if (widely deployed) IETF protocols 
prevented such systems from working?  It is possible to design a 
protocol which does not allow "in the clear" traffic [1].  It is not 
clear whether such a protocol would be widely deployed.

>There is no reason why the 'default' insecurity of HTTP cannot be
>handled at the technical level.  Do I believe all HTTP2 traffic MUST be
>encrypted?  Perhaps, and perhaps not.  But most certainly, the 'default'
>for HTTP2 traffic should be encryption.



1. That is different from the "default".