Re: [perpass] perpass: what next?

[Stefan Winter <[e-mail]>]

Hello,

> Would there be value to deploy this at IETF meeting networks?

There was a very long and for me depessing thread on this question; once
on attendees of a meeting where I reached out to get 1X security done;
once on [e-mail] (thread starting 27 April 2014 "Security for the
IETF wireless network").

It seems like the use case at IETF meetings is so different from normal
corporate use that attendees don't see significant enough value in
security the 1X network properly.

The story goes like this... Since the network uses username+password
=="ietf/ietf" there is no risk to leak personal credentials. So there is
no need to authenticate the network to the user.
My argument that users could fall into a rogue 1X evil clone if they
don't get provisioned proper security settings was waved away with
statements such as that nobody should trust the network anyway, and that
the situation is no different on the open ietf network.

Needless to say that I was extremely unhappy with that way of thinking,
but at some point I gave up (I considered to set up an evil twin myself,
but don't want to be overly nasty).

It's like... everybody should eat our dogfood, except ourselves. :-(

Stefan

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