Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response-01
Joseph Lorenzo Hall <joe@cdt.org> Thu, 05 December 2013 14:09 UTC
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Subject: Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response-01
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 On 12/4/13 12:09 PM, Bruce Perens wrote: > > The potential is that you could be giving aid and comfort to "the > enemy" by constructing a technical hinderance to intelligence > gathering by your own national intelligence agency or by your > country's intelligence partners. It looks from here that this falls > under the later paragraphs of France's penal code definition of > treason. (apologies this is long... hopefully it's fun to read) Hi Bruce, It's probably been a bit less than a decade since last we spoke, I hope you are well. Like many, I find much to disagree with in your draft response. First, I wouldn't use the adjective "political" but "policy" indicating that in addition to the technical side of communications infrastructure, there are also norms, rules, and laws to which we as a society agree (either globally through commitments to human rights or locally through culture, laws, and norms). There are many of us -- although I'd say not nearly enough, we're all hiring! -- that work in the policy space and try to advocate carefully for why the current state of affairs (and where entities like the USG want to go in the future) can not stand. A democracy is not a democracy if it is in a constant state of pervasive surveillance. At CDT we've worked with many people on this list -- and whome you likely know -- to advocate for infrastructural security and to point out that many, many countries are involved in essentially attacking users against the more broad public interest: https://www.cdt.org/files/pdfs/CALEAII-techreport.pdf https://www.cdt.org/files/pdfs/nsa-review-panel-tech-comment.pdf On the "downstream side, many of you may have missed this 2-year effort (before Snowden!!) to document "systematic access", or governments of the world demanding access to data the private sector holds... i.e., it's certainly not just the U.S. or FVEY countries exploiting data the private sector holds but increasingly every sovereign entity (note one of the authors, Lee, was a former general counsel to the NSA): https://www.cdt.org/systematic-access https://cdt.org/files/pdfs/govaccess2013/government-access-to-data-comparative-analysis.pdf The reason I excerpted what you say above is the following: just like it used to be many decades ago, the government cannot tap everything. That is a fact. There are methods of communication that it will not be able to tap, and there will be standards and tools that enable highly secure communication. It seems overwhelmingly rational to protect communications against strong adversaries in the passive case ("upstream" so to speak) and to beef up but not eliminate methods of surveillance that are both legal and further the public interest in safety as narrowly as possible. The reason the NSA, CIA, etc. in the US and FVEY countries can collect so much information is a combination of path dependence -- standards did not contemplated pervasive threats and our daily lives are increasingly mediated by protocols -- and over-zealous "we can, so we will" thinking inspired by a state of terror. Let me say that more clearly: if terrorism's goal is to put a populace into a state of terror, this has certainly been accomplished for our intelligence agencies, who justify any encroachment on the lives of normal citizens as "why not? if it saves 1 person"... without thinking about the very Heisenbergian conundrum that the act of pervasive surveillance -- and not just how it is executed -- will undoubtedly move us farther from democracy (and yes there are many other things that affect that... e.g., campaign finance, voting technology, and voting rights). What I would like to see is a recognition and acceptance that there will be secrets that governments can not know, and that they will inevitably have to get back to actual police work -- not exploiting the fabric of globally digital society. This is why it is imperative to many of us to make sure the technical side supports this to the best of our ability... as Nick said later on this thread, without pervasive encryption we are vulnerable to numerous adversaries, despite what you think of their intentions and goals (and effectiveness, as Jake rightly notes, is simply a joke). best, Joe - -- Joseph Lorenzo Hall Chief Technologist Center for Democracy & Technology 1634 I ST NW STE 1100 Washington DC 20006-4011 (p) 202-407-8825 (f) 202-637-0968 joe@cdt.org PGP: https://josephhall.org/gpg-key fingerprint: 3CA2 8D7B 9F6D DBD3 4B10 1607 5F86 6987 40A9 A871 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.13 (Darwin) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iQIcBAEBCAAGBQJSoIkCAAoJEF+GaYdAqahxo2kP+wdYMOrOKLiQMi5DvVsbEBGh pXFZyyWvkIvsH8FSIKIY/+aOrLBuQ2ibqWNxdZqCtTomzCCjbpGkZWDm2LHYXSVG iTI/gTzL8wFbr9jIbtA2Rw1fnvfp6bxwCFv71/xRTXi4hLMbh979nkMkwx8i6pdH t9tc1R8G/pfbJ1ze93RNX7E+fm51ILvCIJPTqc6Tq+uZbcwA/55aXeWcymRtte72 AwygyLkGmy0En0G6tMovCKFIZO39KDr7ITcz/2pJJP0W/+yL8n8rH1RLy4+ZL7va SVYvteSi9rEsCs9HfLGprlvtZYWmSHSwkufrdmXSSteOqhzukQu9qcO7bHGkowpn CDpwl3WdZ/B44nxLBCM3BOQa4CKx2tCjNvtmkLcny6svhZnjS8O3LXhfX2WWxFah Cjdfd2HQIbDmc3ORTfwYPluKVHMgvEOTDUgYQIvigyCi20nOLbWM+cBPp47TC+9A +NcvzDDxt0c+KyX59K5ztbRMj/vEJ7A+IO0pJtaZp639BI4uU3RrRQ/3Iubt/hxp a1/keKsISpsAHRYa4rgJzZ0bZDY7xvfpKLzwkTM6Ue+w16+Vook+8qqrQE7Xf8/3 /6wmScJe8faddoNnnW5TQDVUmQxFFkK9RDGX0Nw/9euV79SIBqyl2ncHMBZOSi0I NMSTq+VVhg4RbdMwI2Su =SNG+ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
- [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response-01 Bruce Perens
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… JOSEFSSON Erik
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Martin Millnert
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Stephane Bortzmeyer
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Hannes Tschofenig
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Yoav Nir
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… S Moonesamy
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Bruce Perens
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Theodore Ts'o
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Bruce Perens
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Nicholas Weaver
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Bruce Perens
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Nicholas Weaver
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Brian E Carpenter
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Bruce Perens
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Martin Thomson
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Bruce Perens
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Bruce Perens
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Nicholas Weaver
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Andreas Kuckartz
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Bruce Perens
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Bruce Perens
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Brian E Carpenter
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Ted Lemon
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… l.wood
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Bruce Perens
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Bruce Perens
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Ted Lemon
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Ted Lemon
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Bruce Perens
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Ted Lemon
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Bruce Perens
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Bruce Perens
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Ted Lemon
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Stephane Bortzmeyer
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Joseph Lorenzo Hall
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Eliot Lear
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Pranesh Prakash
- Re: [perpass] Fwd: Re: perens-perpass-appropriate… Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… SM
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Andreas Kuckartz
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Jacob Appelbaum
- [perpass] Egal wie man diskutiert (was: perens-pe… SM
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Paul Ferguson
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Bruce Perens
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Nicholas Weaver
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Bruce Perens
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Nicholas Weaver
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Bruce Perens
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Nicholas Weaver
- Re: [perpass] Fwd: Re: perens-perpass-appropriate… Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Andreas Kuckartz
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Ralf Skyper Kaiser
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Bjoern Hoehrmann
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… John Wroclawski
- [perpass] Using the abusrd isn't a compelling arg… Bruce Perens
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Bruce Perens
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Bruce Perens
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Bruce Perens
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Nicholas Weaver
- Re: [perpass] Egal wie man diskutiert Hannes Tschofenig
- [perpass] Fwd: Re: perens-perpass-appropriate-res… Bruce Perens
- [perpass] Fwd: Re: perens-perpass-appropriate-res… Bruce Perens
- Re: [perpass] Fwd: Re: perens-perpass-appropriate… Christian Huitema
- Re: [perpass] Fwd: Re: perens-perpass-appropriate… Nicholas Weaver
- Re: [perpass] Egal wie man diskutiert Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [perpass] Egal wie man diskutiert Kent_Landfield
- Re: [perpass] Egal wie man diskutiert Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Robin Wilton
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Robin Wilton
- Re: [perpass] Fwd: Re: perens-perpass-appropriate… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [perpass] Fwd: Re: perens-perpass-appropriate… Hannes Tschofenig
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Albert Lunde
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Robin Wilton
- Re: [perpass] Fwd: Re: perens-perpass-appropriate… Stephen Kent
- Re: [perpass] Fwd: Re: perens-perpass-appropriate… Stephen Kent
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Dave Crocker
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Richard Barnes
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Dave Crocker
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Bruce Perens