Re: [perpass] Another mail-related proposal

Randy Bush <> Sun, 18 August 2013 07:37 UTC

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Date: Sun, 18 Aug 2013 16:37:50 +0900
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From: Randy Bush <>
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Subject: Re: [perpass] Another mail-related proposal
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> I'm having more trouble coming up with use cases where I'd want to
> reject messages that don't use PGP or S/MIME.

visualize a future world where e2e message privacy is the default.  in
that world, some parties could view an unencrypted message as an attack.

> The originator of a message is in a better position to decide whether
> it contains sensitive information. And as the receiver you can't
> generally protect against the message traversing the network in the
> clear -- SMTP is often more than one hop and an earlier hop (or
> submission) could have been in the clear, even if you did require TLS
> for the last hop.

i do what is in my power to do.  just because there might be a weakness
in the system n hops away does not mean i should indulge in weakness.