Re: [perpass] Fwd: FW: I-D Action: draft-farrelll-mpls-opportunistic-encrypt-00.txt

Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Mon, 13 January 2014 15:58 UTC

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Subject: Re: [perpass] Fwd: FW: I-D Action: draft-farrelll-mpls-opportunistic-encrypt-00.txt
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Stephen,

> I think opportunistic IPsec could certainly help yes. I'm not sure if 
> this use-case is being considered in that work. 
I think it out to be. Experience has shown that getting all of the 
details right for a
layer 3 security protocol is hard. BTW, MPLS is (lower) layer 3, not 
layer 2.
>> - But even at layer 2, there are existing solutions like WPA or MacSec.
>> Can none of them be used (or extended) for this use case and do we
>> really have to develop both the bulk encryption and key exchange from
>> scratch?
> And that too.
>
> However, my understanding of MPLS is that basically neither IPsec
> nor layer 2 crypto are used in many or possibly most cases. My hope,
> (and I'd not put it stronger than that for now), is that this might
> be a another useful tool in the tool-box that could have a better
> chance of being deployed if we develop it with together with MPLS
> folks who'd like such a tool. Though I'm sure there'll be MPLS
> and other folks who hate the idea as well, we'll see.
I suspect you're right that IPsec is not used often in this context.
The use of MPLS would be qualitatively different, because it would
be offered by an ISP, not by a subscriber. Maybe that would result
in more encrypted traffic because ISPs would offer it as a low
cost service.
> Overall, my goal is to get some crypto that's deployable for
> protecting MPLS traffic and I'm not fussed whether that means
> re-using a flavour of IPsec nor some L2 stuff from elsewhere, nor
> whether it turns out that we need to re-do some things in a way that
> works better for our "customers" as in the proposal here.
L2 stuff won't work across AS boundaries, unless the MPLS
tunnel crosses those boundaries.