Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response-01

Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com> Wed, 04 December 2013 23:55 UTC

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From: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>
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To: Bruce Perens <bruce@perens.com>
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Subject: Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response-01
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On Dec 4, 2013, at 6:41 PM, Bruce Perens <bruce@perens.com> wrote:
>> I think it's generally accepted that what videos we watch is private (there's a federal law in the U.S. making it illegal for video stores to give out that information).
> They are private, and encrypted, but the encryption doesn't protect us. It only "protects" the video provider who believes that the whole internet will run away with their content if we are not forcibly restrained. If it works at all.

That's not my point.  My point is that if you are worried about cycles spent encrypting stuff, that's what you should be worried about, not the relatively trivial percentage of cycles that would go to encrypt http.

> So, build browsers that request https preferentially. Publish that as a recommendation. But please don't lock everyone into your solution.

The statements you've made thus far do not as far as I can tell provide any logical basis as a consequence of which the IETF could sensibly honor your request.   For example, you haven't explained why you think we should bowdlerize all our protocols to make sure that they are legal in even the most repressive state.