Re: [perpass] privacy implications of UUIDs for IoT devices

Fernando Gont <fgont@si6networks.com> Fri, 14 October 2016 10:25 UTC

Return-Path: <fgont@si6networks.com>
X-Original-To: perpass@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: perpass@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 39FEF1296F0 for <perpass@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri, 14 Oct 2016 03:25:58 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -0.358
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.358 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DATE_IN_PAST_06_12=1.543, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=no autolearn_force=no
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id C5Co_ZXhnXyN for <perpass@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri, 14 Oct 2016 03:25:57 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from fgont.go6lab.si (fgont.go6lab.si [IPv6:2001:67c:27e4::14]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0CC131296F2 for <perpass@ietf.org>; Fri, 14 Oct 2016 03:25:57 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from [10.56.30.17] (unknown [116.84.110.50]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by fgont.go6lab.si (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 1A19681A4A; Fri, 14 Oct 2016 12:25:52 +0200 (CEST)
To: George Michaelson <ggm@algebras.org>, Peter Saint-Andre - Filament <peter@filament.com>
References: <5c32e81f-7e43-2bde-b8f4-46f08fecdefb@cs.tcd.ie> <db516334-43ab-e967-cfd5-87d920b65015@filament.com> <CAKr6gn2EjAwqvTXgNyO0Jc3yt9qFRfixXMURHg3wQLe4FcwWWQ@mail.gmail.com>
From: Fernando Gont <fgont@si6networks.com>
Message-ID: <e1419c8a-9e6c-f9d0-e46c-e5c03827e498@si6networks.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Oct 2016 01:20:13 -0300
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/45.3.0
MIME-Version: 1.0
In-Reply-To: <CAKr6gn2EjAwqvTXgNyO0Jc3yt9qFRfixXMURHg3wQLe4FcwWWQ@mail.gmail.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/perpass/SAQoHGxFGTrEomurlblT9NJpmC8>
Cc: "perpass@ietf.org" <perpass@ietf.org>, Dave Thaler <dthaler@microsoft.com>
Subject: Re: [perpass] privacy implications of UUIDs for IoT devices
X-BeenThere: perpass@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.17
Precedence: list
List-Id: "The perpass list is for IETF discussion of pervasive monitoring. " <perpass.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/perpass>, <mailto:perpass-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/perpass/>
List-Post: <mailto:perpass@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:perpass-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/perpass>, <mailto:perpass-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 14 Oct 2016 10:25:58 -0000

On 10/05/2016 09:01 PM, George Michaelson wrote:
> As an example the IEEE MAC registry is really only to provide
> uniqueness, but its been demonstrated to act as a passive-capture
> mechanism to identify probable host architecture from on-the-wire
> sniffs. This then leads directly to: "If its a Dell, then I know the
> iDrac default password so I can attempt to see if this is a badly
> configured Dell which has iDrac IPMI on the host address" and like
> attacks.
> 
> Unique identifiers are being used by the cellular provider to offer
> price differentiated service to people on the same basic substrate.
> Which is a poshed-up way of saying you can get a SIM which is dataplan
> for an iPad but if you put it in your phone you are in breach of
> contract over the use of that SIM. I am not personally a fan of this
> legalism, but it is legal, and it is an ism.
> 
> I think there is a fundamental tension between baked in uniqueness,
> probabalistic uniqueness (think ULA) and non-unique state in Layer-2
> and Layer-3

Please see: draft-gont-numeric-ids-generation-01

Thanks,
-- 
Fernando Gont
SI6 Networks
e-mail: fgont@si6networks.com
PGP Fingerprint: 6666 31C6 D484 63B2 8FB1 E3C4 AE25 0D55 1D4E 7492