Re: [perpass] Tiny stacks

Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> Mon, 09 December 2013 23:21 UTC

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Date: Mon, 09 Dec 2013 18:21:23 -0500
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From: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
To: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
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Cc: perpass <perpass@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [perpass] Tiny stacks
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On Mon, Dec 9, 2013 at 6:07 PM, Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>wrote:

> On 9 December 2013 15:03, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:
> > In point of fact, most of the interesting IoT vulnerabilities we've seen
> so
> > far have not been due to either of the above problems, but rather to
> > manufacturers making stupid decisions that couldn't have been fixed by
> any
> > number of RFCs.
>
> Do you mean to say that RFCs are not the place to address this
> introduction problem, or that people ignore RFCs?  The latter is
> something we already deal with; the former seems doable, were there
> the will to do so.
>

I'm thinking of things like these...
<
http://thehackernews.com/2013/08/hacking-HP-printers-Vulnerability-wifi-password.html#
>
<http://bgr.com/2013/11/20/lg-smart-tv-spying/>

... which do not seem like RFC-able things (so, the latter).  Both are poor
design decisions; the first not applying authentication/authorization, and
the second, well, just epically failing. What are you going to do, require
someone to set a jumper for DNT?