Re: [perpass] Draft charter for a Transparency Working Group

How's this?

[1] A cryptographically verifiable log is an append-only log of hashes
of more-or-less anything that can prove its own correctness
cryptographically.

For example, from RFC 6962: “The append-only property of each log is
technically achieved using Merkle Trees, which can be used to show
that any particular version of the log is a superset of any particular
previous version. Likewise, Merkle Trees avoid the need to blindly
trust logs: if a log attempts to show different things to different
people, this can be efficiently detected by comparing tree roots and
consistency proofs. Similarly, other misbehaviours of any log (e.g.,
issuing signed timestamps for certificates they then don't log) can be
efficiently detected and proved to the world at large.”

See RFC 6962, http://www.links.org/files/CertificateTransparencyVersion2.1a.pdf
and http://www.links.org/files/RevocationTransparency.pdf for
background.

On 12 December 2013 16:36, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> wrote:
> Ben
>
>
>> How about this footnote?
>>
>> "A cryptographically verifiable log is an append-only log of hashes of
>> more-or-less anything that can prove its own correctness
>> cryptographically. See RFC 6962,
>>
> I'd like something a bit more technical, since the phrase "prove its
> own correctness" is pretty general. Hopefully there is text in 6962
> that you can use.
>
> Steve
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