[perpass] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-fenton-smtp-require-tls-01.txt

Jim Fenton <fenton@bluepopcorn.net> Sun, 14 February 2016 19:55 UTC

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From: Jim Fenton <fenton@bluepopcorn.net>
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Subject: [perpass] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-fenton-smtp-require-tls-01.txt
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I thought I would point out this draft on the perpass list, because its
primary purpose is to give email senders some degree of control over
whether their messages are sent between MTAs using TLS -- and therefore
how susceptible messages are to pervasive passive surveillance.

Discussion of this draft has thus far been on the ietf-smtp list.


-------- Forwarded Message --------
Subject: 	New Version Notification for draft-fenton-smtp-require-tls-01.txt
Date: 	Sat, 13 Feb 2016 15:36:57 -0800
From: 	internet-drafts@ietf.org
To: 	Jim Fenton <fenton@bluepopcorn.net>

A new version of I-D, draft-fenton-smtp-require-tls-01.txt
has been successfully submitted by Jim Fenton and posted to the
IETF repository.

Name:		draft-fenton-smtp-require-tls
Revision:	01
Title:		SMTP Require TLS Option
Document date:	2016-02-13
Group:		Individual Submission
Pages:		10
URL:            https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-fenton-smtp-require-tls-01.txt
Status:         https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-fenton-smtp-require-tls/
Htmlized:       https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-fenton-smtp-require-tls-01
Diff:           https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-fenton-smtp-require-tls-01

   The SMTP STARTTLS option, used in negotiating transport-level
   encryption of SMTP connections, is not as useful from a security
   standpoint as it might be because of its opportunistic nature;
   message delivery is prioritized over security.  This document
   describes a complementary SMTP service extension, REQUIRETLS.  If the
   REQUIRETLS option is used when sending a message, it causes message
   delivery to fail if a TLS connection with the required security
   characteristics cannot be completed with the next hop MTA or if that
   MTA does not also advertise that it supports REQUIRETLS.  Message
   originators may therefore expect transport security to be used for
   messages sent with this option.


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

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