[perpass] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-fenton-smtp-require-tls-01.txt
Jim Fenton <fenton@bluepopcorn.net> Sun, 14 February 2016 19:55 UTC
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From: Jim Fenton <fenton@bluepopcorn.net>
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Subject: [perpass] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-fenton-smtp-require-tls-01.txt
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Hi, I thought I would point out this draft on the perpass list, because its primary purpose is to give email senders some degree of control over whether their messages are sent between MTAs using TLS -- and therefore how susceptible messages are to pervasive passive surveillance. Discussion of this draft has thus far been on the ietf-smtp list. -Jim -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: New Version Notification for draft-fenton-smtp-require-tls-01.txt Date: Sat, 13 Feb 2016 15:36:57 -0800 From: internet-drafts@ietf.org To: Jim Fenton <fenton@bluepopcorn.net> A new version of I-D, draft-fenton-smtp-require-tls-01.txt has been successfully submitted by Jim Fenton and posted to the IETF repository. Name: draft-fenton-smtp-require-tls Revision: 01 Title: SMTP Require TLS Option Document date: 2016-02-13 Group: Individual Submission Pages: 10 URL: https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-fenton-smtp-require-tls-01.txt Status: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-fenton-smtp-require-tls/ Htmlized: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-fenton-smtp-require-tls-01 Diff: https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-fenton-smtp-require-tls-01 Abstract: The SMTP STARTTLS option, used in negotiating transport-level encryption of SMTP connections, is not as useful from a security standpoint as it might be because of its opportunistic nature; message delivery is prioritized over security. This document describes a complementary SMTP service extension, REQUIRETLS. If the REQUIRETLS option is used when sending a message, it causes message delivery to fail if a TLS connection with the required security characteristics cannot be completed with the next hop MTA or if that MTA does not also advertise that it supports REQUIRETLS. Message originators may therefore expect transport security to be used for messages sent with this option. Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org. The IETF Secretariat
- [perpass] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft… Jim Fenton
- Re: [perpass] Fwd: New Version Notification for d… Yakov Shafranovich
- Re: [perpass] Fwd: New Version Notification for d… Jim Fenton
- Re: [perpass] Fwd: New Version Notification for d… Yakov Shafranovich