Re: [perpass] DNS confidentiality

Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer@nic.fr> Wed, 13 November 2013 09:34 UTC

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Date: Wed, 13 Nov 2013 10:33:21 +0100
From: Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer@nic.fr>
To: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>
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References: <20131111121027.GA31723@sources.org> <CEA6999F.25B2C%gwiley@verisign.com> <CA+9kkMDTYZ8tKnGigojWQDuDM3K0uPyoW2fesH1ueAFbTZMBrQ@mail.gmail.com> <CABkgnnVuX3bV1XMKsY1g6GOkZmhfxo=Zt9iUryt0wt+9K8tFkA@mail.gmail.com> <5282D6A3.5060205@cs.tcd.ie> <4AE06389-A46C-4F14-849E-62DC9FA7F128@fugue.com>
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Cc: Ted Hardie <ted.ietf@gmail.com>, perpass <perpass@ietf.org>, Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer@nic.fr>, Andy Wilson <andrewgwilson@gmail.com>, "Wiley, Glen" <gwiley@verisign.com>, Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
Subject: Re: [perpass] DNS confidentiality
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On Tue, Nov 12, 2013 at 09:48:57PM -0500,
 Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com> wrote 
 a message of 9 lines which said:

> That's a terrible argument.   Then every eavesdropping issue becomes
> a chicken-and-egg problem, because nobody is willing to go first.

Indeed. That's an argument that completely denies the point of
engineering: "Finding good-enough solutions to actual problems". We do
not hope to design perfect solutions. Leakages will always happen. But
we try to have *less* leaks, in order, not to make surveillance
impossible but, as Bruce Schneier said during the plenary, to make
mass surveillance *very* expensive for the spy. Surveillance requires
gathering data from several places and making sense of it. The less
data, the harder it becomes.

Of course, we should not spend too much efforts securing the door when
the window is wide open. But each of us should spend efforts on "his"
part of the Internet. As a DNS guy, I plan to make surveillance using
the DNS harder and more expensive. I'm confident the TLS guys will do
the same.