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Re: [perpass] RSA-OAEP

Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> Wed, 20 November 2013 17:18 UTC

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Date: Wed, 20 Nov 2013 12:18:23 -0500
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From: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Cc: perpass <perpass@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [perpass] RSA-OAEP
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That makes sense.  Would you say the same in the signature domain, i.e.,
PKCS#1 v1.5 -> PSS?


On Wed, Nov 20, 2013 at 12:07 PM, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> wrote:

> I do not know of any place where RSA-OAEP has been called out as the
> mandatory to implement algorithm, but there are many places where PKCS#1
> v1.5 still enjoys this status.  I suggest we make RSA-OAEP the mandatory to
> implement algorithm in our specifications.
>
> Russ
>
>
> On Nov 20, 2013, at 11:09 AM, Richard Barnes wrote:
>
> What are you proposing be done, besides supporting OAEP in new specs or
> back-porting it to old ones?  In order to make people use OAEP, we would
> need to call in the protocol police.
>
>
> On Wed, Nov 20, 2013 at 10:49 AM, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>wrote:
>
>> We have known for a ver long time that PKCS #1 Version 1.5 (see RFC 2313)
>> is vulnerable to adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks when applied for
>> encryption purposes.  Exploitation reveals the result of a particular RSA
>> decryption, requires access to an oracle which will respond to a hundreds
>> of thousands of ciphertexts), which are constructed adaptively in response
>> to previously-received replies providing information on the successes or
>> failures of attempted decryption operations.  As a result, the attack
>> appears significantly less feasible to perpetrate in store-and-forward
>> environments than for interactive ones.
>>
>> PKCS #1 Version 2.0 and Version 2.1 (see RFC 3447) include RSA-OAEP to
>> address this situation, but we have seen very little movement toward
>> RSA-OAEP.  While we are reviewing algorithm choices in light of the
>> pervasive surveillance situation, I think we should take the time to
>> address known vulnerabilities like this one.  If we don't, then we are
>> leaving an partially open door for a well funded attacker.
>>
>> Russ
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