Re: [perpass] privacy implications of UUIDs for IoT devices

George Michaelson <ggm@algebras.org> Thu, 06 October 2016 00:30 UTC

Return-Path: <ggm@algebras.org>
X-Original-To: perpass@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: perpass@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id BC2311294F8 for <perpass@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 5 Oct 2016 17:30:01 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.901
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.901 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=algebras-org.20150623.gappssmtp.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id FVi1aM66Dj1J for <perpass@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 5 Oct 2016 17:29:59 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-ua0-x233.google.com (mail-ua0-x233.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:400c:c08::233]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 82A211294DD for <perpass@ietf.org>; Wed, 5 Oct 2016 17:29:59 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by mail-ua0-x233.google.com with SMTP id p25so3738068uaa.1 for <perpass@ietf.org>; Wed, 05 Oct 2016 17:29:59 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=algebras-org.20150623.gappssmtp.com; s=20150623; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc:content-transfer-encoding; bh=NvHQ++397xUmroY7s6dCkpwUUPn0fSU5P758pWh9bMU=; b=EfLNi60kAl6NkVu23C5Nq4hO32vCy8r1ciWL7Ua0bWikh4mCSNhTVj0J9oo6D51iv+ 0tzFAVWfNm3W4Rw6xa6u4LS2ppuzATWB04E85GHkdI6zzQ8bKuN12oXjiB7XaWwdwfMP b+l8aI/0r7We7zfGA+QOF1gSTmHqz0cQmgX9zO8eE18rWeju1pupe7K4ADEti4HCNJhy WiQVU9ArhAT4cgftbPgkiPP2l907N4xQSOiPwu+9pzK3SQt6oWUskbgH2mgAXwhhPDE4 6xGt+Ou+mly7ptk1C1lLlyR90mceGcadCWzoKfRwhiLnlHg0YnVZePiJ2GZe547xKaHU NyGA==
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc:content-transfer-encoding; bh=NvHQ++397xUmroY7s6dCkpwUUPn0fSU5P758pWh9bMU=; b=lrRV4KbsL+kPeu0pSxLEB9e19SbTodiWYzMeXz25RZUS4w+s7u3XdxRvsDDCNzrh6W WgIQgfj0scDQZruKgDAxQUfYfkBBXlE8KEIo/a3MpEKyCok+W/cCfj5Nn/HVUybZbTFv tvF/Kim16wgBwkwSkF+AZSpQqwFi/CUz8greIVTQzBCDc41KhAKSzLo9WIK6HBKp4D9G r52s/XAOogpz9gE5/Sc5/SQJy1lsuG0PLy8F1sEohsS2Qdd320PPquRYnM+ptTJlu63Y 2p+a4DFKga+pVLeu3uPTYVa8gTN56UvZjXXmEvEPlAsQcaWitXVXdNxXopsrGLdOw2fW BC4w==
X-Gm-Message-State: AA6/9Rn2GJRLOeDwIO0kCjYZIqtxPnfV9vtoKrrauMNYZ+CUVm9paiyV9HaeeH3sX2MNqg4+N5D16wvPWjq+mw==
X-Received: by 10.176.0.176 with SMTP id 45mr9048545uaj.90.1475713798615; Wed, 05 Oct 2016 17:29:58 -0700 (PDT)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Received: by 10.103.95.5 with HTTP; Wed, 5 Oct 2016 17:29:57 -0700 (PDT)
X-Originating-IP: [2001:dc0:a000:4:29c6:ab71:9f28:4d0a]
In-Reply-To: <CY1PR03MB2265659F67817DF02F3FCF29A3C70@CY1PR03MB2265.namprd03.prod.outlook.com>
References: <5c32e81f-7e43-2bde-b8f4-46f08fecdefb@cs.tcd.ie> <db516334-43ab-e967-cfd5-87d920b65015@filament.com> <CAKr6gn2EjAwqvTXgNyO0Jc3yt9qFRfixXMURHg3wQLe4FcwWWQ@mail.gmail.com> <CY1PR03MB2265659F67817DF02F3FCF29A3C70@CY1PR03MB2265.namprd03.prod.outlook.com>
From: George Michaelson <ggm@algebras.org>
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 2016 10:29:57 +1000
Message-ID: <CAKr6gn0Xj_Eb286OEs1fMi6=p3nZ6ghEz2p4m+phnENOC2vTwA@mail.gmail.com>
To: Dave Thaler <dthaler@microsoft.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/perpass/lVOLobzwLEb47OpbBGMxYLNyz0c>
Cc: "perpass@ietf.org" <perpass@ietf.org>, Peter Saint-Andre - Filament <peter@filament.com>
Subject: Re: [perpass] privacy implications of UUIDs for IoT devices
X-BeenThere: perpass@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.17
Precedence: list
List-Id: "The perpass list is for IETF discussion of pervasive monitoring. " <perpass.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/perpass>, <mailto:perpass-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/perpass/>
List-Post: <mailto:perpass@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:perpass-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/perpass>, <mailto:perpass-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 06 Oct 2016 00:30:02 -0000

btw, my primary goal was illustrative not specific. persistent ID
threats are not exactly like MAC threats, but they probably lie in a
similar space. I have no major concern with the desire to be
deterministically both unique and known, I have this concern that the
mechanisms a manufacturer can use there, tend to processes (IEEE
Registry) which construct higher state (vendor-specific blocks) which
have side effects.

On Thu, Oct 6, 2016 at 10:09 AM, Dave Thaler <dthaler@microsoft.com>; wrote:
> The issue with IEEE MAC's is that it's sent to untrusted observers, not that it is a stable identifier per se.
> It just so happens that you typically don't have a choice but to send it in packets such that it can be observed
> by untrusted observers, hence the need to use randomized MACs.
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: George Michaelson [mailto:ggm@algebras.org]
> Sent: Wednesday, October 5, 2016 5:01 PM
> To: Peter Saint-Andre - Filament <peter@filament.com>;
> Cc: perpass@ietf.org; Dave Thaler <dthaler@microsoft.com>;
> Subject: Re: [perpass] privacy implications of UUIDs for IoT devices
>
> As an example the IEEE MAC registry is really only to provide uniqueness, but its been demonstrated to act as a passive-capture mechanism to identify probable host architecture from on-the-wire sniffs. This then leads directly to: "If its a Dell, then I know the iDrac default password so I can attempt to see if this is a badly configured Dell which has iDrac IPMI on the host address" and like attacks.
>
> Unique identifiers are being used by the cellular provider to offer price differentiated service to people on the same basic substrate.
> Which is a poshed-up way of saying you can get a SIM which is dataplan for an iPad but if you put it in your phone you are in breach of contract over the use of that SIM. I am not personally a fan of this legalism, but it is legal, and it is an ism.
>
> I think there is a fundamental tension between baked in uniqueness, probabalistic uniqueness (think ULA) and non-unique state in Layer-2 and Layer-3
>
> -G
>
> On Thu, Oct 6, 2016 at 9:54 AM, Peter Saint-Andre - Filament <peter@filament.com>; wrote:
>> Over on the CORE WG list, we've had a little discussion about the
>> desirability (or not) of unique identifiers for devices in the
>> Internet of Things. The message below provides some context.
>>
>> I'd be curious to learn more about the attack surface lurking behind
>> Stephen Farrell's comment that having long-term stable identifiers for
>> IoT devices is a privacy-unfriendly practice because people will abuse such identifiers.
>>
>> To be clear, the scenarios I have in mind are not specific to CoAP and
>> don't always involve IP-based networking (the technology I'm working
>> on these days enables mesh networking over long-range radio), but they
>> do involve discovery and eventual communication that is both
>> end-to-end encrypted and as close to metadata-hiding as possible.
>>
>> Thanks!
>>
>> Peter
>>
>> -------- Forwarded Message --------
>> Subject: Re: [core] Implications of IP address / port changes for CoAP
>> & Co
>> Date: Thu, 6 Oct 2016 00:11:26 +0100
>> From: Stephen Farrell
>> To: core@ietf.org <core@ietf.org>;
>>
>>
>> Hi Peter,
>>
>> On 06/10/16 00:03, Peter Saint-Andre - Filament wrote:
>>>
>>> On 10/5/16 4:28 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote:
>>>
>>>> On 05/10/16 23:22, Dave Thaler wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> It is important that every device have a unique UUID that is
>>>>> endpoint-address-agnostic and protocol-agnostic.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Considering the privacy implications I'm not at all sure I'd accept
>>>> that argument. In fact I'd argue we ought encourage that devices not
>>>> have globally unique long-term identifiers at all unless there is a
>>>> real need for those, and unless we understand how to control their
>>>> (ab)use.
>>>
>>>
>>> By "identifier" do we necessarily mean "network identifier"? It seems
>>> to me that it is useful to have a unique long-term identifier for
>>> every device, based on its public key. Whether you can obtain a
>>> network connection to that device based on such information is another story.
>>
>>
>> It is undoubtedly useful to have long term stable identifiers of
>> various kinds. I'd include key IDs and public keys as such.
>>
>> Turns out that it's also fairly universally privacy unfriendly as
>> people will abuse such identifiers for good and bad reasons.
>>
>> So I think we need to get much better at analysing when such things
>> are really needed and in what scope. My bet is that a lot of the time
>> a locally or probabilistically unique more transient identifier would
>> be just fine.
>>
>> But yeah, I can't prove that. OTOH there is a hint in the term "IMSI
>> catcher" isn't there?
>>
>> Cheers,
>> S.
>>
>>>
>>> Peter
>>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> perpass mailing list
>> perpass@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/perpass