Re: [perpass] India withdraws encryption policy - Re: India posed to require cleartext, cleartext retention, cipher and backdoor mandates

On 22/09/15 13:17, Hugo Maxwell Connery wrote:
> Hi,
> 
> Back in August was the process of BCP'ing RFC1984. (Subject:
> Recognising RFC1984 as a BCP).
> 
> If this has been completed, it could act as an 'attachment' or
> compliment in some way the form letter which Brian suggests below.

That has been completed [1] so RFC1984 is now an IETF BCP.

I'm not sure how long the RFC editor will need before this
is visible as BCPnnn but it shouldn't be too long, some weeks
maybe. (It's an odd case though changing status on a 1996 RFC,
so some tooling might break or something;-)

S.

[1]
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ietf-announce/FXpz3-UELhF7S5kBxXvTrRDXSgs

> 
> I repeat that I think the reuse of RFC1984 at this time is an
> excellent strategy as it clearly states "we've been here before, and
> the arguments still hold".
> 
> Regards, Hugo Connery -- Head of IT, DTU Environment,
> http://www.env.dtu.dk ________________________________________ From:
> perpass [perpass-bounces@ietf.org] on behalf of Brian Trammell
> [ietf@trammell.ch] Sent: Tuesday, 22 September 2015 14:04 To: Joseph
> Lorenzo Hall Cc: perpass; Dan York; Stephen Farrell Subject: Re:
> [perpass] India withdraws encryption policy - Re: India posed to
> require cleartext, cleartext retention, cipher and backdoor mandates
> 
> It seems to me in general that this type of policy remains very
> attractive; governments in particular tend to prize temporary
> security over essential freedom. This policy was so obviously silly
> in its technical detail that it would inevitably need to be
> withdrawn, though I was impressed by the speed and openness with
> which that was done here.
> 
> But in general, playing whack-a-mole takes a lot of energy especially
> when the policies themselves are largely copypasta. Perhaps we should
> put together an IAB/program form letter ("So You've Decided to Ban
> Crypto, Here's Why That Won't Work") that we can quickly tailor to
> the details in order to be able to make constructive public comments
> *before* the withdrawal happens next time? :)
> 
> Cheers,
> 
> Brian
> 
> 
>> On 22 Sep 2015, at 13:49, Joseph Lorenzo Hall <joe@cdt.org> wrote:
>> 
>> I'm not so sure we should take comfort in their withdrawal of the
>> policy as all reports are that they are revising and reissuing...
>> We'll see what the next iteration involves!
>> 
>> On Tuesday, September 22, 2015, Dan York <york@isoc.org> wrote: 
>> There was a significant amount of public outcry yesterday within
>> India and the latest news is that the government of India is
>> apparently withdrawing the draft policy:
>> 
>> http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/tech/tech-news/Government-withdraws-draft-of-encryption-policy/articleshow/49057232.cms
>>
>>
>> 
Prior to that the government agency involved had already issued an
update saying that the draft policy would NOT apply to TLS in web
commerce and social media, messaging, etc.  The update document seems to
have been removed, but is captured here by a news site:
>> 
>> http://www.medianama.com/2015/09/223-india-draft-encryption-policy/
>>
>>
>> 
Dan
>> 
>>> On Sep 21, 2015, at 1:07 PM, Stephen Farrell
>>> <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Sheesh, there is so much wrong in that document. And they top it
>>> off by recommending RC4.
>>> 
>>> Does anyone know if this is a policy that is likely to be 
>>> enforced or one that'd be more honoured in the breach?
>>> 
>>> S.
>>> 
>>> On 21/09/15 17:45, Joseph Lorenzo Hall wrote:
>>>> Obviously, of relevance to those that will be at the IAB
>>>> MARNEW workshop this week (although this isn't in any way
>>>> specific to radio networks).
>>>> 
>>>> * Everyone (all individuals and businesses) using encryption
>>>> must store unencrypted content for 90 days * Government will
>>>> dictate algorithms and key sizes * Possibility of a legally
>>>> mandated backdoor
>>>> 
>>>> Article from Daily Dot: 
>>>> http://www.dailydot.com/politics/india-encryption-backdoors-draft-policy/
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> 
Text of the proposal (comments due 16 Oct.):
>>>> https://info.publicintelligence.net/IN-DraftEncryptionPolicy.pdf
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> 
_______________________________________________
>>> perpass mailing list perpass@ietf.org 
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/perpass
>> 
>> -- Dan York Senior Content Strategist, Internet Society 
>> york@isoc.org   +1-802-735-1624 Jabber: york@jabber.isoc.org Skype:
>> danyork   http://twitter.com/danyork
>> 
>> http://www.internetsociety.org/
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> -- Joseph Lorenzo Hall Chief Technologist Center for Democracy &
>> Technology 1634 I ST NW STE 1100 Washington DC 20006-4011 (p)
>> 202-407-8825 (f) 202-637-0968 joe@cdt.org PGP:
>> https://josephhall.org/gpg-key fingerprint: 3CA2 8D7B 9F6D DBD3
>> 4B10  1607 5F86 6987 40A9 A871
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> _______________________________________________ perpass mailing
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> 
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