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Re: [perpass] Fwd: FW: I-D Action: draft-farrelll-mpls-opportunistic-encrypt-00.txt

Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> Fri, 10 January 2014 17:21 UTC

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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Cc: Adrian Farrel <adrian@olddog.co.uk>, perpass <perpass@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [perpass] Fwd: FW: I-D Action: draft-farrelll-mpls-opportunistic-encrypt-00.txt
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Hiya,

On 01/10/2014 04:42 PM, Watson Ladd wrote:
> I think prime field elliptic curves would be more amenable to
> implementation in restricted router
> hardware.

Could be. If this doesn't turn out to be DOA then I'd
fully expect a bunch of discussion on that. For now,
we just picked MODP to avoid having to worry about IPR
FUDdiness.

> How the receiver computes the nonce that goes with the packet is not
> obvious to me from
> what is written.

Oops. Needs a fix:-)

> Otherwise this seems reasonable: it might be worth considering if this
> can be extended to
> authenticate both sides cleanly if some large networks want to be safe
> against that.

Not sure what you mean by cleanly?

Thanks for the comments,
S.

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